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THE PARABLE OF THE SEEDS
With what can we compare the kingdom of God, or what parable
shall we use for it? It is like a grain of mustard seed, which, when
sown upon the ground, is the smallest of all the seeds on earth; yet
when it is sown it grows up and becomes the greatest of all shrubs,
and puts forth large branches, so that the birds of the air can make
nests in its shade.1
Rhetoric matters.2 Rhetorical choices affect all intellectual en-
deavors, but most of all those enterprises whose opposing sides are as
likely to be swayed by mythology as by mathematics. Whenever policy
prescriptions are "indeterminate with a vengeance," 3 a page of cos-
mology is often worth a volume of economics. 4 Even when it "be-
comes so ingrained as to be almost invisible," "rhetoric has the very
real effect of severely constraining our perception of a problem and
its potential solutions."5 In other words, how we pose normative legal
questions "limits and disposes the way in which any answer. . . -right
or wrong-may be given."
6
What metaphor best describes innovation, a process that is "intan-
gible, uncertain, unmeasurable, and often even unobservable"?
7
Choose carefully, for "static gains and losses" traceable to regulatory
policy "are probably small compared to the historical gains in welfare
resulting from innovation and productivity growth."8 As an inspira-
1 Mark 4:30-32. The New Testament offers two other renditions of the parable
of the mustard seed. See Matthew 13:31-32; Luke 13:18-19.
2 Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Dis-
course, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11, 12 (2000).
3 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 519 (3d ed. 1990).
4 Cf N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.) ("[A] page
of history is worth a volume of logic.").
5 Doremus, supra note 2, at 12.
6 SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY. A STUDY IN THE SYMBOLISM OF
REASON, RITE, AND ART 3 (3d ed. 1957).
7 Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger
Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST LJ. 19, 27 (1995).
8 Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2 HAND-
BOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1449, 1484 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989); cf Ha-Joon Chang, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 21 CAM-
BRIDGEJ. ECON. 703, 721 (1997) (lamenting that "current discussions" on regulatory
reform fail to "give adequate attention to considerations of dynamic efficiency"); Jos-
kow & Rose, supra, at 1484 (lamenting how "so little effort has been devoted to mea-
suring the effects of regulation on innovation and productivity growth").
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tional allegory rather than a source of biological knowledge, 9 the par-
able of the mustard seed provides an ideal metaphorical framework
for assessing innovation policy. "[F] aith as a grain of mustard seed"
can move mountains, "and nothing will be impossible."10 Innovation,
no less than the mustard seed, is modest in its inception but magnifi-
cent when fully realized.
Within the realm of the life sciences, the seed bridges several real
and metaphorical divides. Among drivers of evolution, two forces
tower above all others. One of them is food. The other is sex."' Re-
markably, the seed is both. "It is both means of production and, as
grain [or fruit], the product."'12 Seed as phenotype is a mere chattel,
perhaps lunch for another organism. Seed as genotype, however, is at
9 Disputes over Jesus' reference to the mustard seed as the "smallest of all seeds"
have at times overshadowed this parable. These disputes have no bearing on the par-
able, let alone on my modest use of it. In the thirteenth century, St. Albert the Great
acknowledged the existence of smaller seeds even as he elaborated the parable of the
mustard seed as a central allegory of the Christian faith. See STEPHEN F. WAILES, MEDI-
EvAL ALLEGORIES OF JESUS' PARABLES 108-13 (1987). Enlightened thinkers have long
distinguished between the Bible as historical narrative and the Bible as mythology.
See, e.g.,JAMES BARR, THE SCOPE AND AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE 7 (1980) (assigning "the
entire (and supremely important) primeval story" of "creation .... Noah and the
flood, and so on" to the area of "myth and legend" rather than the realm of "his-
tory"); STEPHENJAY GOULD, ROCKS OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE FULLNESS OF
LIFE 81-82 (1999) (reporting how the Vatican, in the half-century between Pius XII
and John Paul II, eventually acknowledged how the "growth of data" and "refinement
of theory" had made it impossible for evolution to "be doubted by people of goodwill
and keen intellect"). "The Bible uses the terms and expressions of the times of its
writers" in order to "convey an infallible revelation" in "cultural terms and expres-
sions" that can be "accommodated to the human mind." BERNARD RAMM, PROTESTANT
BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 192 (2d ed. 1956). Or, in the words of the Bible itself, each
generation must discover "the mystery hidden for ages and generations but now made
manifest to [God's] saints." Colossians 1:26. On the proper role of religion in envi-
ronmental law and other enterprises informed by the life sciences, see generally Jim
Chen, Legal Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories of Origin with
Human Destiny, 29 HARV. E-,NArL. L. REV. 279 (2005).
10 Matthew 17:20; cf. Luke 17:6 ("If you had faith as a grain of mustard seed, you
could say to [a] sycamine tree, 'Be rooted up, and be planted in the sea,' and it would
obey you."). The "sycamine tree," something mentioned nowhere except the Gospel
of Luke, is traditionally considered to be the black mulberry. See LEON MORRIS, THE
GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. LUKE 280 (1988); cf THE WYCLIFFE BIBLE COMMENTARY
1058 (Charles F. Pfeiffer & Everett F. Harrison eds., 1990).
11 Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1278
n.99 (1995). See generally GEOFFREY F. MILLER, THE MATING MIND: How SEXUAL
CHOICE SHAPED THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 8-9 (2000) (distinguishing be-
tween natural and sexual selection as evolutionary forces).
12 JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000, at 10 (1988).
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once a set of instructions for assembling and operating a plant and a
dynamic record of that plant's evolutionary history. 13 Whatever else
might be said for the old biological slogan, this is one sense in which
ontogeny truly does recapitulate phylogeny. 14 "The emerging ability
to program genetic code" into seeds further "blurs the line between
law and artifact, and promises to challenge long-held assumptions in
the legal regime of ownership and control over . . . biological
creations."
1 5
Information embedded in seed is amenable to various forms of
proprietary protection. 16 Indeed, disputes over the ownership of
plant genetic material have yielded some of the most emotionally ex-
plosive battles over intellectual property, not least because narratives
about agriculture and the environment dominate cosmological stories
of origin. 1 7 The "intense spiritual feelings" derived from nature's "un-
13 See generally ANTOINE DANCHIN, THE DELPHIC BOAT: WHAT GENOMES TELL US
(Alison Quayle trans., 2002).
14 In ordinary language, "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" means that any indi-
vidual organism's life cycle replays the entire evolutionary history of that organism's
species. Ernst Haeckel, who also coined the term "ecology," see STEPHEN JAY GOULD,
ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY 76 n.* (1977), developed this convenient but sometimes
misleading biological maxim. Compare GOULD, supra, at 76-78 (describing Haeckel's
role in popularizing and in distorting Darwin's work), with id. at 202-06 (describing
how the discovery of Mendelian genetics undermined Haeckel's work and rehabili-
tated that of his rival, Karl Ernst von Baer).
15 Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological "Lock-Out"
Systems, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1554-55 (2004).
16 See Joseph Straus, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing
Public-Private Initiatives To Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 91, 104 (1998).
17 See, e.g., JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 411 (Penguin 2002) (1952) (stating
that "there is one story in the world, and only one"); Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin
and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280 (1989); Robert M. Cover, The
Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179, 180 & n.7 (1985)
(describing the origins of law in "the sacred narratives of our world"). Compare Lynn
White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 Sci. 1203 (1967) (describing the
Book of Genesis as the origin of the Judeo-Christian tradition's strictly instrumental
attitude toward nature), with John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV.
1171 (1998) (describing the story of Noah as the Judeo-Christian basis for advocating
biodiversity conservation). See generallyJ. BAIRD CALLICO-rT, EARTH'S INSIGHTS: A SUR-
VEY OF ECOLOGICAL ETHICS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN TO THE AUSTRALIAN OUT-
BACK 14 (1994) (identifying the "historical roots of European attitudes and values" on
the environment); DAVID KINSEY, ECOLOGY AND RELIGION: ECOLOGICAL SPIRITUALITY IN
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1995); JOHN PASsMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NA-
TURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS (1974); Jim Chen, Of Agricul-
ture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1261 (1995); Jim Chen, Webs of
Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REv. 495,
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fathomable complexity and . . . sublime beauty"18 turn quickly into
spite once humans attend the gritty business of making a living-or a
killing-from natural resources. The deceptively simple act of plant-
ing seed conceals an enterprise "so vast that fully to comprehend it
would require an almost universal knowledge ranging from geology,
biology, chemistry and medicine to the niceties of the legislative, judi-
cial and administrative processes of government." 19
As an economic matter, seeds present no fewer problems for the
law of intellectual property than do pharmaceutical products. Drugs
are exceptionally susceptible to unauthorized duplication because
they are durable, subject to intense demand, relatively inexpensive to
produce, easily transported, and readily imitated at a minute fraction
of the original research and development costs. 20 In their struggle
against drug copying enterprises, pharmaceutical companies do not
so much rue the loss of retail sales in less developed countries as they
fear gray-market "leakage" of those drugs back into the lucrative mar-
kets of the developed world. 2 1 Like artistic creations and other public
goods, 22 drugs heed no "natural physical barriers that exclude poten-
tial consumers," "may be held by more than one person at a time," can
be distributed at "minimal or nonexistent" cost, and once disclosed
face "no real barriers to free appropriation. '2 3 Seeds exhibit all of
these characteristics. 24 They inject a further complication that does
598-602 (2004);Judith M. Green, Retrieving the Human Place in Nature, 17 ENvTE. ETH-
iCS 381, 389-93 (1995).
18 DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIwERSIW PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE 255
(1996).
19 Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1943)
(making this claim in the context of dairy production).
20 See Otto A. Stamm, GATT Negotiations for the Protection of New Technologies, 73 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'V 680, 685 (1991).
21 See F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 913, 928 (2002) (describing this
phenomenon as "parallel trade"). See generally K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281 (1988) (describing legal measures designed to curb the "gray market").
22 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
23 Dan L. Burk, Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal
Preemption, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 585 (1993); see also OFtICE OF TECH. ASSESS-
MENT, U.S. CONG., FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 (1992) (explaining how "free
riders" impede the efficient production of public goods). See generally ROBERT S.
PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 663-65 (2d ed. 1992) (describing
the economics of public goods).
24 See ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 16-17
(1987).
2005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
not afflict most other subjects of intellectual property. At least in the
case of self-pollinating plants, seeds reproduce of their own accord.
"Copying," often a deviant and difficult deed for would-be infringers
in many other industries, is the definition of agriculture. Whether
cultivating plants or raising animals, farmers specialize in inducing liv-
ing organisms to reproduce. Plant breeders therefore face two
sources of competitive pressure whenever they release seed into the
market. Not only must they fend off competing breeders, but every
customer is also a potential rival.2 5 To be sure, drugs, music, and mov-
ies are easily pirated even in poor countries. But arable land and the
ability to plant crops are truly ubiquitous. Dirt and green thumbs
come cheap. "From the standpoint of a producer of innovation, the
notion of a self-replicating invention presents as compelling a case for
intellectual property intervention as can be imagined.
'2 6
This Article will focus on the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970
(PVPA),27 especially in light of that statute's 1994 amendments. 28 In
the 2001 decision of J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Interna-
tional, Inc.,29 the Supreme Court finally conclusively held that sexually
reproduced plants eligible for protection under the PVPA are also eli-
gible for utility patents under the Patent Act.30 J.E.M. Ag Supply
thereby confirmed what the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences had held in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty3 l: like "anything [else] under the sun that is
made by man,"3 2 new, useful, and nonobvious sexually reproduced
plants not otherwise found in nature may be patented.33 Although
25 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 12, at 280.
26 Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury... ?
39 Hous. L. REv. 727, 730 (2002); cf. Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology
Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 117, 151 (2004) ("[M]ost
technology does not replicate itself in the way that living organisms do. Technology
generally is used as a tool to make something else or as a component in making
something else but not to make a new version of itself, except perhaps in the case of
certain software applications in which code replicates itself.").
27 Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 and 28 U.S.C.).
28 See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 108
Stat. 3136 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
29 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
30 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
31 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
32 Id. at 309.
33 See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (B.P.A.I. 1985); cf. Ex parte La-
timer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123, 126 (1889) (refusing to grant patents on "the trees
of the forest and the plants of the earth"). Since 1930, utility patents on asexually
reproduced plants (except those propagated by tubers) have been available under the
[VOL. 8 1: 1110
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the availability of utility patents for plants may tempt us to dismiss the
PVPA as "sound and fury signifying nothing, '34 the PVPA remains a
significant source of interest. In strictly practical terms, the twenty-
year term of plant variety certificates will extend the life of the PVPA
well into the future.35 Moreover, in a world where conventional plant
breeding techniques continue to hold the key to food security despite
the presence of advanced genetic engineering, 36 the law may do well
to retain an interest in a lower-cost source of intellectual property
rights in plant genetic resources. Finally, the PVPA contains two ex-
emptions not found in patent law. The PVPA entitles farmers to save
protected seed. It also protects the right of competitors to use pro-
tected varieties in developing new hybrids or varieties. The PVPA's
crop and research exemptions temper what would otherwise be that
statute's greater appeal to plant breeders vis-d-vis the Patent Act.
These exemptions are conspicuously absent from the Patent Act and
have figured prominently in litigation over the PVPA.
Interpretive controversies involving the PVPA-or, for that mat-
ter, any other body of intellectual property law-should be resolved in
favor of constitutional interest in "the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."37 All forms of intellectual property embody a deliberate bar-
gain between the preservation of incentives to innovate and the
broadest possible dissemination of knowledge. Patents, copyrights,
plant variety protection certificates, and other forms of intellectual
property are not and should not be "given as favors."'38 Rather, they
"are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the
right, limited to a term of years .... to exclude others from the use of
his [or her] invention."39 Just as Congress intends the availability of
Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164. See generally Imazio Nurs-
ery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-
Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976); Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of
1930: A Sociological History of Its Creation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 621
(2000).
34 SeeJanis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 728; cf. WILLIM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act
5, sc. 5.
35 See 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b) (2000). The term of protection extends twenty-five
years for trees and vines. See id. § 2483(b) (1) (B).
36 See Jonathan Knight, Crop Improvement: Dying Breed, 421 NATURE 568 (2003);
Ann Marie Thro & Paul Zankowski, Classical Plant Breeding Is the Route to Food Security,
422 NATURE 559 (2003). See generally Keith Aoki, Malthus, Mendel, and Monsanto, Intel-
lectual Property and the Law and Politics of Global Food Supply, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 397
(2004).
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
39 Id.
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copyrights "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good, '40 Congress expects the PVPA "to afford adequate encourage-
ment for research, and for marketing when appropriate, to yield for
the public the benefits of new varieties."' 41 "The greatest service which
can be rendered any country is to add a useful plant to its culture,"
wrote Thomas Jefferson. 42 The PVPA should be read as though this
aspiration pervaded all of its provisions.
Part I of this Article outlines the case for a substantive canon of
statutory interpretation derived from the Constitution's requirement
that federal intellectual property laws advance "the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts." Part II applies this canon to the PVPA. After
introducing the statute, Part II addresses the PVPA's controversial
crop and research exemptions. In addition to the statutory require-
ment that applicants for plant variety protection deposit reproductive
material in a public repository, Part II discusses the practice of "seed-
wrap" licensing as a contractual response to reproductive breeding,
"brown-bag" sales, and other activities putatively conducted under the
aegis of the PVPA's research and crop exemptions. The conclusion
defends this Article's constitutionally informed approach to resolving
these controversies under the PVPA.
I. HARMONIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WITH "THE PROGRESS OF
SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS"
The United States Constitution not only authorizes Congress to
"secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"; it also demands
that such grants "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
43
The succinct "twenty-seven words ... which give Congress the power
to legislate copyrights and patents... contain the only use of the right
in the entire main body of the Constitution. '44 This clause is both a
grant of power and a limitation on that grant. It is the sole constitu-
tional grant of power that "begins with a prescription of proper legis-
40 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
41 7 U.S.C. § 2581 (2000); accord, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S.
179, 181 (1995); Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
42 THE GARDEN AND FARM Boos OF THOMASJEFFERSON 509 (Robert C. Baron ed.,
1987).
43 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44 David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v
421, 425 (1983).
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lative purpose. '45  Indeed, the framers of the Constitution
enumerated this power within the federal government's fundamental
charter in order to impose "express limitations" upon it. 4 6 By virtue of
its statement of purpose, the patent and copyright clause is arguably
the most dynamic of provisions in a Constitution filled with dynamic
provisions. 47 At an absolute minimum, "the Progress of Science and
useful Arts" contemplates at least as much social change as any other
constitutional phrase, such as "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
48
"cruel and unusual punishments, ' 4 9 and "Commerce among the sev-
eral States." 50 No less than even "due process of law," faith in "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts" expresses the expectation that
"[o] ur Constitution [as] a covenant running from" generation to gen-
eration enables each generation to reject "anew . .. ideas and aspira-
tions" not fit to "survive more ages than one.
'51
"The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the
individual but the advancement of the arts and sciences. Its induce-
ment is directed to disclosure of advances in knowledge which will be
beneficial to society; it is not a certificate of merit, but an incentive to
disclosure. ' 52 Proprietary protection of ideas should be designed to
spur "release to the public of the products of . . . creative genius";
45 PaulJ. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intel-
lectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119,
1153; see also Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:
The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, 2J. IrEri. PROP. L. 1, 32-33 (1994).
46 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 486 (1953); Heald & Sherry, supra note 45, at 1154 & n.274.
47 Cf U.S. CONST. pmbl. (describing the Constitution as having been adopted "in
Order to ... secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity"); McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("This provision
is made in a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.").
48 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
49 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J.)
(describing the Eighth Amendment as responsive to "evolving standards of decency").
50 See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1355 (1994).
51 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
52 Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945); see
also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.'"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (same).
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incidental "reward to the owner [is] a secondary consideration."5 3 In-
troducing an idea to the global community in the broadest sense is
the very purpose of intellectual property.5 4 "[I] n respect to works al-
ready created," however, any grant of intellectual property "creates no
economic incentive at all."
'55
A patent "is a privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose":
a spur to innovation and a product of realized invention, a patent "is
limited to the invention which it defines. '5 6 Since "the marginal cost
of producing information, knowledge, or culture is zero,"57 informa-
tion should presumptively be as "free as the air to common use.''58
Proprietary exceptions to that general rule are justified solely to the
extent that they overcome the so-called "appropriability problem." Al-
though unfettered access to information ordinarily provides the ideal
environment for human creativity, a lower, "indeed suboptimal level
of innovation" may result if a would-be inventor cannot "recover the
costs of invention because the resulting information [is] available to
all."59
53 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); accord, e.g.,
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Admittedly, the second sentence of 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000), which provides that "[p]atentability shall not be negatived by
the manner in which the invention was made," was added to the statute in 1952, see
Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798, in order to counteract earlier
judicial suggestions that an inventor's eligibility for a patent hinged on his or her
showing of a "flash of genius," see H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 18 (1952).
54 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the
United States and the primary objective in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labor of authors.").
55 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 257 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf Dennis
S. Karjala, The Term of Copyright (observing how the protection of existing work consti-
tutes an economically destructive, preemptive strike against future innovation), in
GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY 33,
42-44 (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997).
56 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
57 Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Informa-
tion, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1252 (2003).
58 Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
59 Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 247 (1994). But cf Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Intellec-
tual Monopoly, 45 INT'L ECON. REV. 327 (2004) (arguing that monopoly, especially
when conferred through intellectual property, is neither a prerequisite to nor a neces-
sary consequence of innovation and that intellectual property, as a practical matter, is
more likely to stunt innovation and growth). This is the sense in which private prop-
erty of any sort, including property in inventions and artistic works, shares the core
mission of free trade, that of minimizing deadweight losses stemming from the failure
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The contemporary law of intellectual property routinely falls
short of its stated ideal of advancing the progress of science and the
useful arts. The political economy of innovation policy exerts "inexo-
rable pressure to recognize as an axiom the principle that if some-
thing appears to have substantial value to someone, the law must and
should protect it as property. '60 The mere assertion of value repre-
sents a presumptive and often conclusive claim to property.61 This
romantic view of authorship is stifling innovation. 62 The maximalist
tendency in contemporary intellectual property law is perhaps best il-
lustrated by Eldred v. Ashcroft,63 the 2003 decision in which the Su-
preme Court upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act of 199864
over objections that retroactive extensions of existing copyrights vio-
lated the Constitution's requirement that rights for inventors and au-
thors be granted for "limited Times."
Precisely because the Supreme Court is reluctant to enforce sub-
stantive limits on Congress's power to grant patents, copyrights, and
comparable forms of intellectual property, the legal system must re-
sort to more creative ways of vindicating the underenforced constitu-
tional interest in "the Progress of Science and useful Arts. '6 5 Courts
should interpret intellectual property laws in light of this explicit (if
occasionally undervalued) constitutional aspiration. In the specific
context of copyright, Eldreds suggestion that "First Amendment scru-
tiny is unnecessary" when "Congress has not altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection" 66 clearly implies that significant
"First Amendment scrutiny is in order when Congress has altered
those contours."67 Though the First Amendment's guarantee of free
of private parties to complete economically efficient transactions. See Robert C. El-
lickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1326 (1993).
60 Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age,
108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1725 (1999).
61 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 405 (1990).
62 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management, "97 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Author-
ship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, The Mod-
ern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE LJ. 1687, 1715 (1999).
63 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
64 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.).
65 See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 I-LARv. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
66 537 U.S. at 221.
67 Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual Property
and Free Speech in the "Digital Millennium, "89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1349 (2005).
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speech affects only copyright and not patent, 68 the inherent limita-
tions on the Intellectual Property Clause govern all manifestations of
that constitutional power. When confronted with multiple ways of in-
terpreting an intellectual property statute, a court should be prepared
to explain how its preferred construction advances the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts. "[T]he patent system represents a carefully
crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclo-
sure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclu-
sive monopoly for a limited period of time."6 9 Every grant of
intellectual property strikes some balance between providing incen-
tives for innovation and preserving public access to information. The
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution "reflects a balance be-
tween the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of mo-
nopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in
the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts.'-
70
Rather than reading intellectual property laws without regard to
their potential impact on innovation, courts should stress the distinc-
tive elements of the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause.
Among other things, an insistence that rights follow affirmative contri-
butions to knowledge and vigilant preservation of the public domain
flow from the language of the Constitution and the implicit logic of
the Supreme Court decisions it has inspired.71 The Constitution's em-
phasis on "Inventors and Authors" demands that some sort of inven-
tive or creative step be the basis for legal protection. Standing alone,
the sweat of the brow is not enough. 72 Moreover, in order to ensure
that such "exclusive Right[s]" as Congress confers do not exceed "lim-
68 On the relationship between the First Amendment and copyright law, see gen-
erally Marci A. Hamilton, Art and the Marketplace of Expression, 17 CARDOZo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 167 (1999); David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright
Policy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2004); William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First
Amendment Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and
Review, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003).
69 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (emphasis added); see also
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1966); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23
(1829).
70 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
71 See Heald & Sherry, supra note 45, at 1167 (outlining four principles-"suspect
grant," "quid pro quo," "authorship," and "public domain"-that define the Supreme
Court's "interpretive methodology in cases involving implied constitutional restraints"
such as those imposed by the Intellectual Property Clause).
72 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353-60 (1991).
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ited Times" prescribed by the Constitution,73 courts should vigorously
uphold and enforce legal provisions that disclose the nature of an in-
vention, enable other parties to exploit its underlying technology, and
eventually transmit the knowledge gained to the public at large. At
their inception, intellectual property rights may issue only if the recip-
ient delivers a benefit that the public did not previously enjoy.
7 4
When intellectual property rights expire, the resulting infusion of
knowledge into the public domain ensures that the "public will not be
permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist's [or inventor's] la-
bors. '75 The failure to ensure passage into the public domain as the
crucial, truly public-regarding step of the transaction 76 would per-
versely reward those parties who are "least prompt to communicate
their discoveries. ' 77 Even worse, it "would materially retard the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts."
'7 8
So formulated, this approach to interpreting intellectual property
laws would add another substantive canon to the federal courts' al-
ready extensive list of heuristic rules that unapologetically favor some
policy-oriented way of reading certain statutes. 79 From the rule of len-
ity in criminal law80 to the presumption that Indian tribes are immune
from state regulation,8 1 substantive canons advance legal interests that
transcend the precise words of individual statutes. For example, sec-
73 Cf Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) ("[I]t has never been
pretended.., that an inventor has a perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing
invented.").
74 See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534; Heald & Sherry, supra note 45, at 1162; Robert A.
Kriess, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitu-
tional Limitation on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REv. 31, 60 (1999).
75 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); cf Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 6 (1965) ("Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects
are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available.").
76 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Kellogg Co. v.
Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v.June Mfg. Co., 163
U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
77 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829).
78 Id.
79 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAD. L. REv. 1 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking,
45 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law]; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26 (1994).
80 See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
81 See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
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tion 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)8 2 estab-
lishes a substantive canon that urges courts to interpret statutes in
favor of aggressive environmental protection: "The Congress autho-
rizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . the policies,
regulations and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in"
NEPA.83 This language unambiguously requires the environmental
laws of the United States to be interpreted and implemented so that
they address all significant environmental risks, for the benefit of fu-
ture generations as well as today's citizenry, to the limits of economic
feasibility.
8 4
To be sure, substantive canons of statutory interpretation do have
their drawbacks. Especially when they draw upon the Constitution as
a source of inspiration or authority, substantive canons represent a
form of stealth constitutional law.8 5 Aggressive interpretation of intel-
lectual property statutes may open a back door to the very sort of ac-
tive intervention that courts routinely forswear when they are asked to
pass on the constitutionality of these enactments. After all, the very
existence of federal intellectual property rights means that Congress
has seen fit to grant some measure of "exclusive Rights," and courts
must respect the exercise of legitimate legislative prerogative. Even
the substantive canon prescribing narrow construction of public
grants by the government to private parties,8 6 the traditional canon
that most closely resembles the intellectual property canon I am pro-
posing, is not an inexorable command to foreclose private access to
public lands and other government-owned resources. Public grants
can sometimes be liberally interpreted when private benefits have
been given in order to expedite some sort of great public purpose,
such as the construction of the transcontinental railroad.8 7 Similarly,
82 Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852, 853-54 (1970).
83 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
84 See DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-PRAGMATISM 126-27 (1999); Nicholas Yost, NEPA's
Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533, 536 (1990).
85 See Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 79, at 636-37; cf
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 79, at 12-14 (distinguishing between putatively neu-
tral "language canons" and "substantive canons" that are consciously intended "to
reflect a judicially preferred policy position").
86 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
87 See, e.g., Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979); Platt v.
Union Pac. Ry. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 59 (1878) ("The work was vast, beyond the reach of
private capital or enterprise. It could be accomplished only by the bestowal upon a
corporation of very large governmental aid.... The construction of a [transcontinen-
tal] railroad ... was most uninviting to private capitalists. To induce them to embark
in the enterprise was the overshadowing motive that dictated the act of 1862."); cf.
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the intellectual property canon should not uniformly constrict propri-
etary grants or facilitate the reckless award or extension of rights in
intangible property,8s but rather should be flexible enough to counsel
either the enhancement or reduction of proprietary protection, as the
societal interest in the creation and dissemination of inventions
warrants.
Copyright and patent law already vindicate this constitutional in-
terest in ways that are well understood. Under copyright law, the fair
use doctrine8 9 enables the law to resolve conflicts sparked by clashes
between new technology and the proprietary rights of incumbents. 90
Fair use also facilitates price discrimination among purchasers with
different levels of wealth and ability to find substitutes for copyrighted
goods.91 For its part, the Patent Act has a highly effective tool for
facilitating the eventual transmission of patented information to the
public domain.92 Section 112 of the Patent Act provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the inven-
tion, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (permitting transfers between
private property owners to satisfy the requirement that takings of property be for a
"public use" under the Fifth Amendment).
88 Cf Heald & Sherry, supra note 45, at 1169 (asserting that "[i]t is difficult to
imagine a more overt violation" of the Constitution's concern for "the Progress of
Science" than a "retroactive grant of copyright protection").
89 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work.. . for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple cop-
ies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.").
90 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982)
(describing fair use as a legal response to market failure); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefin-
ing the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997); AdrienneJ. Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appro-
priate Standards To Apply, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 635, 635-36 (1984) ("Successful resolu-
tion of the ... tension between products of... new technolgies and copyright law will
depend largely on the doctrine of fair use."); cf Fred H. Cate, The Technological Trans-
formation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1395 (1996) (urging a restoration of copy-
right law to the subject matter it covered before information came to dominate the
economy).
91 See Michael Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDozo L. REv.
55 (2001); cf Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors,
Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DuKE L.J. 241, 244-45
(1996) (calculating the increased cost of copyrighted music relative to music in the
public domain).
92 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1024 (1989).
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in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly con-
nected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
9 3
By requiring every patent applicant to describe his or her invention in
writing, § 112 enables comparably skilled experts to duplicate that in-
vention once patent protection expires. 94 Disclosure through § 112
must teach those in the art to make and use the invention without
undue experimentation. 95 The written description and enabling dis-
closure demanded by § 112 do more than raise hurdles to patenting
in the first instance or limit the scope of the patents that are granted.
These apparent formalities also facilitate the patent law's "ultimate
goal": that of "bring[ing] new designs and technologies into the pub-
lic domain through disclosure.
96
The PVPA falls within the shadowy zone between the established
copyright and patent "paradigms" of intellectual property law. 97 As a
result, how the PVPA advances the progress of science and useful arts
remains shrouded in mystery. This much is clear: the PVPA falls far
short of the Patent Act's "extensive" requirements that an inventor
describe his or her invention and disclose how it might be duplicated
by others once the patent on that invention expires. 98 The PVPA's
very vagueness on a point central to innovation policy demands the
aggressive application of a substantive canon of interpretation that ad-
vances this constitutional interest. In passing the PVPA, Congress re-
lied not only on its more general power " It] o regulate Commerce...
among the several States," 99 but also on the Intellectual Property
93 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
94 See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, 721 F.2d 1540, 1556-58 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In
re Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 105-06 (C.C.P.A. 1981); cf In reWertheim, 541 F.2d 257,
262-63 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (distinguishing between § 112's two distinct requirements-
namely, that the applicant provide a "written description" and that this description
"enable[ ] [any] person skilled in the art" to duplicate the invention).
95 Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
1986); accord, e.g., Genetech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
1997); see also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (observing that a
later practitioner of the relevant art may be required to conduct routine screening
and other types of experimentation, as long as the necessary experimentation is not
"undue").
96 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
97 See generally J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Para-
digms, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2432 (1994);J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Pat-
ent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System,
13 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1995).
98 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142-43
(2001) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2422(2) (2000)).
99 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Clause of the Constitution. 100 This declaration effectively invites
courts to calibrate their interpretation of the PVPA according to the
constitutional provision that simultaneously authorizes Congress to
enact intellectual property laws and constrains any use of that power
without regard to temporal limits or to "the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts."'10 1 Though Congress may use its power over inter-
state commerce to protect some interests that it cannot reach through
the Intellectual Property Clause, 102 the Commerce Clause cannot be
treated as an open-ended license to evade the explicit, substantive lim-
its on the Intellectual Property Clause. At the very least, courts should
interpret the PVPA in light of its codified purpose of "afford [ing] ade-
quate encouragement for research, and for marketing when appropri-
ate, to yield for the public the benefits of new varieties."'
10 3
I turn now to an application of these admittedly abstract princi-
ples to decidedly concrete and specific controversies arising out of the
PVPA.
II. INTERPRETING THE PVPA IN FURTHERANCE OF INNOVATION POLICY
A. The PVPA in Overview
The PVPA confers intellectual property on "[t] he breeder of any
sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other than
fungi or bacteria) who has so reproduced the variety."10 4 A "variety" is
"a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known
rank, that.., can be defined by the expression of the characteristics
resulting from a given genotype or a combination of genotypes." 10 5 In
order to be eligible for protection under the PVPA, a plant variety
must satisfy four requirements. First, it must be "new, in the sense
that, on the date of filing of the application for plant variety protec-
tion, propagating or harvested material of the variety has not been
sold or otherwise disposed of ... for purposes of exploitation of the
variety" for more than one year in the United States or more than four
years in any foreign jurisdiction. 10 6 "[I]n the case of a tree or vine,"
the grace period for exploitation outside the United States is six years
100 See 7 U.S.C. § 2581 ("Constitutional clauses 3 and 8 of article I, section 8 are
both relied upon.").
101 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
102 See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879).
103 7 U.S.C. § 2581; accord, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181
(1995); Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
104 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a).
105 Id. § 2401 (a) (9).
106 Id. § 2402(a)(1).
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prior to the date of filing.10 7 Second, the variety must be "distinct, in
the sense that the variety is clearly distinguishable from any other vari-
ety the existence of which is publicly known or a matter of common
knowledge at the time of the filing of the application.' 108 "The dis-
tinctness of one variety from another may be based on one or more
identifiable morphological, physiological, or other characteristics (in-
cluding any characteristics evidenced by processing or product charac-
teristics, such as milling and baking characteristics in the case of
wheat) with respect to which a difference in genealogy may contribute
evidence." 10 9 Third, the variety must be "uniform, in the sense that
any variations are describable, predictable, and commercially accept-
able."' 10 Finally, the variety must be "stable, in the sense that the vari-
ety, when reproduced, will remain unchanged with regard to the
essential and distinctive characteristics of the variety with a reasonable
degree of reliability commensurate with that of varieties of the same
category in which the same breeding method is employed.""'1
A certificate of plant variety protection gives the breeder "the
right . . . to exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for
sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it, or using it in
producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different
variety therefrom." 112 The final component of the breeder's right,
that of "exclud[ing] others from .. .using" a protected variety "in
producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different
variety," is echoed in the PVPA's definition of infringement. l 13 In the
absence of a statutory exemption from liability, the use of unlawfully
secured samples of proprietary seed to develop a competing plant va-
riety would violate the PVPA: "Except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, it shall be an infringement of the rights of the owner of a
protected variety to .. .use the variety in producing (as distinguished
from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.""a 4
The PVPA contains an intriguing limitation designed to preserve
the "public interest in wide usage" in an otherwise protected vari-
ety."1 5 The Secretary of Agriculture may "declare a protected variety
open to use on a basis of equitable remuneration to the owner," but
107 Id. § 2402(a) (1)(B) (ii).
108 Id. § 2402(a) (2).
109 Id. § 2401 (b) (5).
110 Id. § 2402(a) (3).
111 Id. § 2402(a) (4).
112 Id. § 2483(a) (1).
113 Id.
114 Id. § 2541 (a) (4).
115 Id. § 2404.
[VOL. .8 1: 1122
THE PARABLE OF THE SEEDS
only if the Secretary determines that compulsory licensing of a pro-
tected variety "is necessary in order to insure an adequate supply of
fiber, food, or feed in this country and that the owner is unwilling or
unable to supply the public needs for the variety at a price which may
reasonably be deemed fair."116 Compulsory licensing under this pro-
vision "shall remain in effect not more than two years."
11 7
The PVPA's public interest provision represents merely a single
instance in which the United States has consciously limited the reach
of its intellectual property laws in order to advance competing public
interests. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton favored a system of
prizes and awards over the copyright and patent system that the Con-
stitution eventually adopted.118 Madison and Hamilton's counter-
parts elected copyrights and patents as a fiscally conservative
alternative to direct subsidies from what was then a thin and precari-
ous federal treasury.1 9 Although intellectual property eventually pre-
vailed as the United States' principal tool for motivating innovation,




118 See Donald W. Banner, An Unanticipated, Nonobvious, Enabling Portion of the Con-
stitution: The Patent Provision-The Best Mode, 69J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 631,
637, 639 (1987).
119 See Walterscheid, supra note 45, at 39-40. See generally David McGowan, Ethos
in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN.
L. REv. 755 (2001) (describing Hamilton's plans to establish the creditworthiness of
the new federal government and to spur industry throughout the infant Republic).
120 For instance, although civilian nuclear technology is ineligible for patents,
Congress has authorized prizes in the interest of compensating inventors who work in
this field. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181, 2183 (2000). Federal copyright law directs ad hoc
arbitration panels to set reasonable royalties for a variety of works, including secon-
dary transmissions by cable television systems, networks, and superstations; pho-
norecords of nondramatic musical works; public performance of musical
compositions through jukeboxes; and artwork and music used in public radio and
television broadcasts. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(2), 119, 801, 802 (2000). The Clean
Air Act authorizes the compulsory licensing of patented air pollution control technol-
ogy. See 42 U.S.C. § 7608. By limiting a patent holder's remedy against unlicensed
use or manufacture by the United States government to "reasonable and entire com-
pensation for such [unlicensed] use and manufacture," American patent law effec-
tively entitles the federal government to a compulsory license on any patented
technology it sees fit to exploit. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). In response to a 1993
lawsuit alleging that an ophthalmologist had violated a patent on a technique for
cataract surgery, see Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (D. Vt. 1995)-evi-
dently the first action in the United States that enforced a medical procedure patent
against a physician, see William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 651, 653 (1995); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the
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To my knowledge, however, the PVPA's "public interest" provi-
sion has never been invoked. Evidently, at no time since 1970 has the
United States approached so precarious a state of food security that
the Secretary of Agriculture has felt compelled to compromise propri-
etary interests conferred under the PVPA. 121 The PVPA contains two
further limitations of arguably greater interest to breeders and policy-
makers. The PVPA's extravagantly complicated and controversial
"crop exemption" in principle permits a farmer "to save seed" from
protected varieties and to "use such saved seed in the production of a
crop."122 The other exemption, known as the PVPA's "research ex-
emption," declares simply that "[t] he use and reproduction of a pro-
tected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not
constitute... infringement."'123
These exemptions represent the most significant distinctions be-
tween the PVPA and the Patent Act. But for its crop and research
exemptions, the PVPA might be the legal tool of choice for commer-
cial plant breeders seeking to protect their investment in new plant
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1176 (1999)-Congress barred the enforce-
ment of patents on medical procedures against allegedly infringing physicians. See
Medical Activity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101 (a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009 (codi-
fied as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000)). See generally, e.g., Council on Ethical &
Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Ethical Issues in the Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341 (1998); Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical and
Surgical Procedure Patents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 91, 111 (1996); Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note, Patenting Medical Procedures: A
Search for a Compromise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 1527, 1544
(1997). But cf. Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method Patents and the Fifth Amend-
ment: Do the New Limits on Enforceability Effect a Taking?, 4 U. BAIT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
147, 177 (1996) (concluding that a statutory limitation on the enforceability of these
patents would constitute an unlawful taking without just compensation of the paten-
tees' intellectual property interests in new medical methods).
121 Cf Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1, 33-34 (2001) ("The United States emerged from World War II with so much
surplus agricultural capacity that it has been feeding the rest of the world ever
since.... Only a nation that is obscenely rich by the West's historical standards and
the larger world's contemporary standards can indulge in food aid either as a means
of suppressing domestic supplies or as a tool for shaping foreign relations, much less
both."). For background on the impact of law on global food security, see generally
Aoki, supra note 36. On domestic food supply policy during the last period of serious
food insecurity in American history, see Guadalupe T. Luna, The New Deal and Food
Insecurity in the "Midst of Plenty, "9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 213 (2004). For an overview of
contemporary American food aid policies that is as incisive as it is concise, see gener-
ally Vernon W. Ruttan, Does Food Aid Have a Future?, 80 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON. 572
(1998).
122 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
123 Id. § 2544.
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varieties. Whereas "patents are relatively expensive to obtain and set a
higher threshold for protection," plant variety protection "is easier
and cheaper to obtain."'124 In contrast with the PVPA's relatively mod-
est request for "a 'description of the variety' setting forth its distinc-
tiveness, uniformity and stability and a description of the genealogy
and breeding procedure, when known," the Patent Act demands far
more "extensive" obligations of description and disclosure.' 25 Noth-
ing in the PVPA imposes the equivalent of the Patent Act's require-
ments of nonobviousness 126 and enablement.' 27 In particular, the
absence of a nonobviousness requirement "is a significant difference
if one accepts that the nonobviousness criterion performs the princi-
pal work of discriminating between patent-worthy and patent-unwor-
thy inventions."'128 In short, whereas the Patent Act offers robust
protection in exchange for a comprehensive disclosure of the technol-
ogy underlying a new plant variety, the PVPA grants much weaker pro-
tection upon delivery of a lower-quality disclosure. 129
Given the historic difficulty that plant breeders have encountered
in attempting to satisfy the Patent Act's description requirement,
130
124 Janis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 777.
125 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142-43
(2001) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2422(2)).
126 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) ("A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains."). On the impact of the nonobviousness requirement on high-risk, capital-
intensive biotechnological research, see generally Karen I. Boyd, Nonobviousness and
the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a Doctrine of Economic Nonobviousness, 12 BERE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 311 (1997); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual
Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2225-26 (2000); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual
Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 827
(1999).
127 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.").
128 Janis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 748.
129 See Mark D. Janis &Jay P. Kesan, Designing the Optimal Intellectual Property System
for Plants: A U.S. Supreme Court Debate, 19 NATURE BIOTECH. 981, 982 (2001).
130 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,... as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his inven-
tion."); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 312 (1980) (reporting that plants were
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the PVPA provides an alternative, more accessible legal system in
which the plant genome essentially speaks for itself. The PVPA's ex-
emptions, however, have effectively diverted many plant breeders to-
ward the Patent Act. In exchange for fulfilling the Patent Act's more
rigorous process, plant breeders can evade the PVPA's research and
crop exemptions.1 3 1 Quite significantly, "the right to save seed of
plants registered under the PVPA does not impart the right to save
seed of plants patented under the Patent Act. '1 3 2 Patent-holders are
also immune, unlike their counterparts whose varieties are protected
only under the PVPA, from the use of a certified plant variety to de-
velop a new inbred line. The PVPA defines the "use" of a protected
"variety in producing . . . a hybrid or different variety" as infringe-
ment, but excludes from that definition the use of a protected variety
in "developing" such a variety.
133
In light of the salience of the PVPA's crop and research exemp-
tions, the next two Parts of this Article will examine each of these
exemptions in detail.
B. The Crop Exemption
Controversies over the PVPA's crop exemption trace their origin
to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants.1 34 This agreement's usual acronym, UPOV, is derived from
the French name of the organization that administers the convention:
Union pour la Protection des Obtentions Vdgtales. American accession in
this treaty in 1970 committed the United States as a "Contracting
Party [to] grant and protect breeders' rights. 1 35 UPOV authorizes its
once thought "not amenable to the 'written description' requirement of the patent
law" insofar as "new plants may differ from old only in color or perfume" and thus
defy "differentiation by written description").
131 SeeJ.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 129 n.1,
140 (2001).
132 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1232 (2003); see also Burk, supra note 15, at 1571 ("Patents that overlap PVPA
rights appear... to eradicate the exemptions in the PVPA.").
133 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (4) (2000); seeJE.M., 534 U.S. at 143.
134 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2,
1961 (revised on Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 1978, and Mar. 19, 1991) [hereinafter
UPOV], available at http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/ 1991/act
1991.
135 Id.; see also id. art. 14 (describing the scope of breeders' rights); cf. Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27(3) (b), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1208 (committing mem-
bers of the World Trade Organization to "provide for the protection of plant varieties
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contracting parties to implement an optional limitation on breeders'
rights in favor of farmers. This snippet of international law has dra-
matically affected the PVPA. Article 15 permits UPOV's signatory
countries to adopt an exception endorsing the traditional agricultural
practice of saving seed:
[E]ach Contracting Party may, within reasonable limits and subject
to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder, re-
strict the breeder's right in relation to any variety in order to permit
farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the
product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on
their own holdings, the protected variety .... 136
On the authority of this provision in UPOV, Congress included
an expansive "crop exemption" within section 113 of the PVPA. Sec-
tion 113 has always allowed farmers who plant seed protected by a
PVPA certificate to engage in a "bona fide sale for other than repro-
ductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes." 13 7
This uncontroversial aspect of the crop exemption protects farmer-to-
market sales of a crop grown from protected seeds as food or feed or
for other nonreproductive purposes.1 38 Indeed, if the PVPA lacked
this exemption, the statute would bar farmers from selling any pro-
tected crop whose seed is sold for food or fiber. Throughout the his-
tory of the PVPA, section 113 has also permitted farmers "to save seed
produced by [them] from seed obtained, or descended from seed ob-
tained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes
and [to] use such saved seed in the production of a crop" for on-farm
use. 13 9 This facet of the crop exemption protects the traditional agri-
cultural practice known as "bin run," or the use of seed from one crop
to produce subsequent crops. 140 At least with respect to self-pol-
linated crops such as wheat, soybeans, and cotton, all of which
reproduce true-to-type, legal protection of bin run effectively restricts
a breeder to a single sale of each variety to each individual grower of a
either by patents or by an effective sui generis system"), reprinted in WORLD TRADE OR-
GANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS 321 (1995). On the United States' accession in the 1970 and 1991 versions of
the UPOV treaty, see generally S. EXEC. REP. No. 105-15 (1998); H.R. REP. No. 103-
699, at 8-9 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2423, 2424-25; Janis & Kesan,
supra note 26, at 742-45.
136 UPOV, supra note 134, art. 15(2) (emphasis added).
137 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
138 See Scott D. Wegner, The Plant Variety Protection Act: Has the Farmer Exemption
Swallowed the Act?, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Apr. 1992, at 4, 5.
139 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
140 See Wegner, supra note 138, at 4-5.
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particular crop.14 1 (Cross-pollinated hybrid crops such as corn, sor-
ghum, and sunflowers are a different matter; because they lose hybrid
vigor after a single planting, farmers must buy new seed each planting
season.) 14 2 The bin run exemption is a robust version of copyright
law's "first sale" doctrine 43 : the plant breeder gets exactly one chance
to sell the information "encoded" in PVPA-certified seed to any indi-
vidual farmer.
As enacted in 1970, however, section 113 also allowed "a person,
whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for
other than reproductive purposes, to sell such saved seed to other per-
sons so engaged, for reproductive purposes."144 This version of the
statute prevailed for nearly a quarter century. Its effect was plain: the
old crop exemption enabled farmers to go directly into the business
of selling PVPA-protected seeds alongside the plant breeders. In one
of the earliest cases interpreting section 113, a federal court of appeals
recognized the incompatibility between brown-bag sales under the
crop exemption and the PVPA's overarching purpose of spurring the
development of new plant varieties:
In purpose and operation, the farmer exemption appears to be at
odds with the primary purpose of the Act. While the main body of
the Act assures developers of novel varieties the exclusive right to
sell and reproduce that variety, the crop exemption dilutes that ex-
clusivity by allowing individual farmers to sell the protected variety
without liability. The broader the construction given the exemp-
tion, the smaller the incentive for breeders to invest the substantial
time and effort necessary to develop new strains. The less time and
effort that is invested, the smaller the chance of discovering supe-
rior agricultural products. If less time and effort is invested, long-
term benefits to the farmer in the form of superior crops and
higher yields will be lost.
14 5
In what was then an authoritative interpretation of the brown-
bagging provision, the Federal Circuit in 1992 allowed farmers to sell
up to half of the crops they harvested from PVPA-certified seed in
"brown-bag" transactions with other farmers. 1 46 Such brown-bag sales
141 See id.
142 See id. See generally RATTAN LAL AGRAwAL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PLANT BREEDING
AND HYBRID SEED PRODucTION (1998).
143 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
144 PVPA, Pub. L. No. 91-577, § 113, 84 Stat. 1542, 1555 (1970), amended in part by
Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, § 10, 108 Stat.
3136, 3142.
145 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1983).
146 See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486, 490 (Fed. Cir. 1992), rev'd,
513 U.S. 179 (1995).
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would be overtly and unapologetically intended for reproductive pur-
poses. A dissenting judge objected that the Federal Circuit's permis-
sive interpretation could have enabled an enterprising farmer, selling
"only half of [each] crop ... as seed in successive years," to flood the
commercial seed market after three years with something "between
2,037 and 11,655 bushels of seed. ' 147 The inescapable mathematical
logic of this situation begins with the recognition that a "single bushel
of soybean seed will produce between 25 and 45 bushels of soybeans"
and ends with the conclusion that a "single soybean seed, after three
crops, [will] produce 27,000 seeds.
148
The legal firestorm over brown-bagging would not go wholly un-
checked. The judicial and legislative branches of the United States
government eventually intervened. In the 1995 decision of Asgrow
Seed Co. v. Winterboer,14 9 the Supreme Court limited brown-bag sales to
"only such seed as [a farmer] has saved for the purpose of replanting
his own acreage." 150 While the Asgrow Seed Co. case awaited the Su-
preme Court's decision on the merits, Congress in 1994 repealed the
brown-bagging provisions of the PVPA's crop exemption.15 1 In con-
formity with the Supreme Court's presumptive refusal to grant retro-
active effect to statutes, 152 Asgrow governed only cases filed under the
PVPA as that statute read before its 1994 amendments; all post-1994
sales of seed protected under the PVPA have conveyed no brown-bag-
ging privileges on farmers. Today the crop exemption provides:
Except to the extent that such action may constitute an infringe-
ment under subsections (3) and (4) of section 2541 of this title, it
shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed pro-
duced by the person from seed obtained, or descended from seed
obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding pur-
poses and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use
147 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 989 F.2d 478, 480 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (New-
man, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
148 Id.
149 513 U.S. 179.
150 Id. at 192.
151 See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349,
§ 10, 108 Stat. 3136, 3142 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2543); Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 184
n.2 (acknowledging the repeal of the brown-bagging provisions of the PVPA's crop
exemption). See generally H.R. REP. No. 103-699, at 8-10, 14-15 (1994) (describing
Congress's reasons for repealing the crop exemption), as reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2423, 2430-31; 139 CONG. REc. 19,979-80 (1993) (statement of Sen.
Kerrey, sponsor of the amendment to eliminate brown-bagging from the PVPA's crop
exemption).
152 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273-80 (1994); Rivers v. Road-
way Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1994).
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on the farm of the person, or for sale as provided in this section. A
bona fide sale for other than reproductive purposes, made in chan-
nels usual for such other purposes, of seed produced on a farm ei-
ther from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding
purposes or from seed produced by descent on such farm from seed
obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes shall not
constitute an infringement. A purchaser who diverts seed from
such channels to seeding purposes shall be deemed to have notice
under section 2567 of this title that the actions of the purchaser
constitute an infringement.
153
By eliminating farmers as a significant source of competition for
commercially developed seed, the legislative rejection of brown-bag-
ging restored much of the PVPA's value to commercial plant breed-
ers. The 1994 amendment also represented a significant setback for
the recognition of farmers' rights in American law. 15 4 Before the
brown-bagging controversy reached its apex in Asgrow, at least one
commentator had urged that the Patent Act be amended, along the
lines of section 113 of the PVPA as originally enacted, to grant the full
panoply of farmers' rights, including the ability to sell embryos and
gametes of patented animals to other farmers on a "brown-bag" ba-
sis. 15 5 After the Asgrow fiasco and Congress's thorough repudiation in
1994 of the PVPA's brown-bagging provision, any proposal to cast pat-
ent law into similar disarray seems mercifully dead.
The PVPA's experience with brown-bagging sheds light on inter-
national efforts to harmonize the law of intellectual property and envi-
ronmental protection. The United States has withheld ratification of
treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity156 out of a be-
lief that legal instruments of this sort enable other countries to erode
the profitability of the United States' life science industries. 157 The
153 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
154 On the international legal status of "farmers' rights," namely, the traditional
agricultural practice of saving seed for future planting, for resale to neighboring farm-
ers, and perhaps even for development of other varieties through conventional cross-
breeding, see Agreed Interpretation of the International Undertaking on Plant Ge-
netic Resources, FAO Conference Res. 4189, § 3, 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. C89/24 (Nov.
29, 1989), available at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu/iutextE.pdf (endorsing the
"concept of Farmers' Rights" and acknowledging "that farmers of all regions have
made" an "enormous contribution ... to the conservation and development of plant
genetic resources, which constitute the basis of plant production throughout the
world").
155 See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System
and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1068-73 (1988).
156 June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
157 See, e.g., Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Programme
Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological
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American experience with the PVPA and its crop exemption demon-
strates that the United States is fully capable of damaging its own eco-
nomic interests without foreign assistance. In retrospect, the damage
done by section 113 to American plant breeders was a gratuitous, self-
inflicted wound. American participation in UPOV did not commit
the United States to restrict breeders' rights for farmers' benefit. Arti-
cle 15 of UPOV carefully distinguished the "optional" farmers' rights
provision from the three "compulsory" exceptions established by that
treaty to breeders' rights: "(i) acts done privately and for non-com-
mercial purposes, (ii) acts done for experimental purposes and
(iii) acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties." 158 To the
extent that section 113 unraveled the PVPA, Congress inflicted that
wound on itself by implementing an optional exception to breeders'
rights under UPOV. In fact, a plant breeder might have plausibly ar-
gued that American law affirmatively offended UPOV to the extent
that the pre-1994 version of section 113 entitled farmers to sell pro-
tected seeds "for propagating purposes" outside "their own holdings."
Article 15 of UPOV, after all, authorized an optional limitation on
breeders' rights for the purpose of "permit[ting] farmers to use for
propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest
which they have obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the pro-
tected variety."1 59 The mandatory provisions of UPOV sanctioned
nothing more than bin run; the original PVPA adopted a far more
expansive exemption permitting brown-bag sales. A quarter-century
later, Congress confined the crop exemption to the propagation of
protected varieties for nonreproductive purposes and to bin run.
Diversity, U.S., May 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 848, 848 (documenting the United States'
initial refusal to sign the Convention because of dissatisfaction with "the text's treat-
ment of intellectual property rights; finances... ; technology transfer and biotechnol-
ogy"); Convention on Biological Diversity, 3 DEP'T STATE DISPATCH 423 (1992)
(describing how the first Bush administration believed that the Convention treated
intellectual property rights "as a constraint to the transfer of technology rather than a
prerequisite"); Karen Anne Goldman, Compensation for Use of Biological Resources Under
the Convention on Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation Measures and Competi-
tiveness of the Biotechnology Industiy, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 695, 714 (1994)
(describing the first Bush administration's objection to the Biodiversity Convention
insofar as that treaty allegedly "requir[es] open access to research activities" and
would thereby "effectively transfer technology at the expense of" intellectual prop-
erty). See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Ratification Resisted: Understanding America's
Response to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1989-2002, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
493 (2002); Adam L. Streltzer, U.S. Biotechnology Intellectual Property Rights as an Obstacle
to the UNCED Convention on Biological Diversity: It just Doesn't Matter, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW
271 (1993).
158 UPOV, supra note 134, art. 15(1).
159 Id. art. 15(2) (emphases added).
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In other words, UPOV authorized an experiment to integrate an
aggressive form of farmers' rights within a sui generis system of intellec-
tual property rights for new plant varieties. That experiment failed
miserably. The United States' renunciation of farmers' rights within
the PVPA should serve notice to the rest of the world: farmers' rights
are incompatible with biotechnology patents.
C. The Research Exemption
The PVPA generally withholds liability from "any act done pri-
vately and for noncommercial purposes." 160 The statute's more fo-
cused research exemption provides that "[t]he use and reproduction
of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research
shall not constitute ... infringement."16 1 "The presence of a research
exemption separate from the noncommercial acts exemption may
suggest that a competing plant breeder can [lawfully] appropriate a
protected variety without authority" and "use it in a breeding program
to develop new commercial varieties," at least as long as such new vari-
eties are different enough not to be "'essentially derived"' from the
original protected variety. 162 The interpretation of the research ex-
emption is vital to the proper functioning of the PVPA, because its
coverage, if misconstrued, could overlap entirely with the statute's def-
inition of infringement. Congress expected that PVPA infringement
would "almost never" arise through "independent work, but by willful
reproduction starting from the protected variety itself."163
PVPA infringement almost invariably begins with a supply of pro-
tected seed. Coupled with sufficient knowledge of agronomy and a
penchant for experimentation, access to PVPA-protected reproductive
matter may enable other parties to propagate specimens of a pro-
tected plant for purposes other than feed, fiber, or food. This is true
even of hybrids, which over the course of the twentieth century be-
came "the predominant form of cultivar in many crops."' 64 Tradition-
ally associated with allogamous, or cross-pollinating, crops such as
"maize, sunflower, brassicas, curcurbits, carrots, beets, and onions,"
the use of hybrid cultivars has become common even "in certain au-
togamous [i.e., self-pollinating] crops, including sorghum, tomato,
and peppers" and in the production of allogamous crops in nonindus-
160 7 U.S.C. § 2541(e) (2000).
161 Id. § 2544.
162 Janis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 751.
163 S. REP. No. 91-1138, at 11 (1970).
164 Arnel R. Hallauer, Breeding Hybrids, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLANT AND CROP SCI-
ENCE 186, 186 (Robert M. Goodman ed., 2004).
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trialized countries. 165 Hybrid corn, perhaps the most commercially
valuable crop produced by this technique, begins with the develop-
ment of two inbred lines "by self-pollination and selection until [each]
line is relatively homozygous."1 66 The use of pollen from the male
inbred line to fertilize silks on the female inbred line then yields hy-
brid seed.
16 7
Despite all precautions, each bag of hybrid seeds contains a small
amount of inbred seeds.'16  These "chasing selfs," if planted,*
reproduce the parent lines true-to-type. With sufficient patience and
land, a competing plant breeder, a farmer, or an academic researcher
can use chasing selfs to unlock the inbred parent lines of a hybrid
variety of corn, sorghum, or sunflower. Planting all the seeds from a
bag of hybrid seed in a configuration that puts adequate space be-
tween plants facilitates ready identification of any inadvertently in-
cluded inbred plants. 169 Lacking heterosis, or hybrid vigor, inbred
plants look different from the taller hybrids. 170 This strategy is admit-
tedly constrained by the extreme scarcity of males in most bags of hy-
brid seed. A hybrid production field typically contains more rows of
female than male plants, often by a ratio of 2:1 or even 4:1.171 Female
plants are either subjected to a male sterility systems or manually
165 Id.
166 Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2
(8th Cir. 1994); see also id. at 1236 n.38.
167 See id. at 1228 n.2. See generally Hallauer, supra note 164, at 187 (describing the
development and deployment of hybrid corn); A.R. Hallauer, W.A. Russell & K-R.
Lamkey, Corn Breeding, in CORN AND CORN IMPROVEMENT 463 (G.F. Sprage & J.W.
Dudley eds., 1988).
168 See B.B. DESAI ET AL., SEEDS HANDBOOK 136 (1997) (describing how the "ge-
netic purity of [a] breeder's seed" can be "maintained by growing the crop in isola-
tion and by rigorous roguing during different phases of crop growth" and "can be
further enhanced by bulk selection, wherein 2000-2500 plants typical of the variety
are selected, harvested, and threshed separately" so that "off-types, if any" may be
discarded and the remaining "uniform seeds are bulked to constitute breeder's
seed").
169 Cf LAWRENCE 0. COPELAND & MILLER B. McDONALD, PRINCIPLES OF SEED SCI-
ENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 246 (4th ed. 2001) ("A corn field planted from single-cross
[hybrid] seed is impressive because the plants tend to be uniform. Plant height, ear
height, tasseling, silking, and pollen shedding are uniform, giving the field good eye
appeal.").
170 See, e.g., id. at 246; DESAJ ET AL., supra note 168, at 548; Hallauer, supra note
164, at 186.
171 See D.N. Duvick, Commercial Strategies for Exploitation of Heterosis, in GENETICS
AND EXPLOITATION OF HETEROSIS IN CROPS 295, 296 (James G. Coors & Shivaji Pandey
eds., 1999); Metaxia Koutsika-Sotiriou, Hybrid Seed Production in Maize, in HETEROSIS
AND HYBRID SEED PRODUCTION IN AGRONOMIC CROPS 25 (Amajit S. Basra ed., 1999).
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detasseled before pollination.1 72 The male rows are removed after
pollination, and only the female rows are harvested for F1 (first-gener-
ation) hybrid seed. 173 The immediate removal of the male parent line
reduces the probability that the harvesting of female rows containing
F1 seed will contain proprietary inbred male seeds. 174 Nevertheless,
in the past decade, major commercial seed breeders have resolved sev-
eral lawsuits alleging breach of intellectual property rights through
use of the "chasing selfs" technique.
175
The crucial issue presented by the research exemption is the defi-
nition of "plant breeding or other bona fide research. ' 176 This verbal
formulation defines the extent of research activities shielded from
PVPA liability. The plain language of the research exemption shields
only genuine, bona fide research activities. Surreptitious acts, such as
efforts to isolate chasing sefs in a bag of hybrid seed, cannot consti-
tute "plant breeding or other bona fide research." The phrase "plant
breeding" must be construed, noscitur a sociis, alongside "bona fide
research." By virtue of "an interpretive rule as familiar outside the law
as it is within, . . . words and people are known by their compan-
ions. ' 177 Whatever else it might be, it is hard to imagine how surrepti-
172 See Duvick, supra note 171, at 296, 303; Koutsika-Sotiriou, supra note 171, at
51-53.
173 See Koutsika-Sotiriou, supra note 171, at 50-51.
174 See A.B. Maunder, Logistics of Seed Production and Commercialization, in GENETICS
AND EXPLOITATION OF HETEROSIS IN CROPS, supra note 171, at 313, 316.
175 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. A03-187, 2004 WL 51671,
at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2004) (resolving an insurance dispute arising from
Cargill's attempt to develop new seed corn lines through "unauthorized experimenta-
tion-such as 'chasing selfs"'); Press Release, Pioneer, Syngenta and DuPont Reach
Agreement on Lawsuits (Nov. 29, 2004), available at http://www.pioneer.com/pio-
neernews/press release/corporate/syngenta.htm (announcing the settlement of a
dispute that included allegations that Syngenta Seeds, Inc., had "inappropriately ac-
quired Pioneer proprietary genetic material ... through a practice known as 'chasing
selfs'"); Dave Price, Cargill Reaps Bitter Harvest in Pioneer Dispute: Company Agrees
to Pay $100 Million, Admits Ethical Lapses in Hybrid Seed Ops (May 17, 2000) (on
file with author); Press Release, Seed Quest, Cargill and Pioneer Announce Settle-
ment of Lawsuit (May 16, 2000), available at http://www.seedquest.com/News/re-
leases/usa/Pioneer/n2682.htm (announcing the settlement of a 1998 lawsuit alleging
that Cargill misappropriated corn seed from Pioneer Hi-Bred International and an-
nouncing that Cargill had agreed to cease "engag(ing] in the practice of isolating
parent seed from bags of ... hybrid seed corn-a process known as 'chasing selfs"').
176 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000).
177 Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 255 (2000); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561, 575 (1995) ("[A] word is known by the company it keeps.. . .");Jarecki v.
G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) ("The maxim noscitur a sociis, ... while
not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many mean-
ings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.").
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tious exploitation of another party's proprietary seed for the purpose
of duplicating that variety could be viewed as a "good faith" activity.
There is nothing "bona fide" about converting another company's
proprietary plant variety. Competitors do not enjoy some sort of
open-ended "breeder's exemption" entitling them to unauthorized
exploitation of proprietary seed.
Other sources of law reinforce the plain meaning of the PVPA's
research exemption. For example, the legislative history of the PVPA
states that "any transfer of title or possession" without authority of the
owner constitutes infringement. 178 "We do not believe," said the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1999, "that
Congress meant for" private parties "to be exempt from infringement
of the PVPA ... if they know they are participating in an illegal activ-
ity." 179 More than two decades ago, the Federal Circuit's definitive
interpretation of the PVPA's crop exemption (at least as that exemp-
tion existed before 1994)180 concluded that the crop exemption "only
exempts sales of the protected variety from one farmer directly to an-
other farmer accomplished without the active intervention of a third
party."1
81
As a general principle of statutory interpretation, provisos and
exemptions should be narrowly construed so that the principal provi-
sions of a statute may retain the vigor that Congress intended to con-
fer upon them.18 2 Within the PVPA itself, Congress has demonstrated
that it is perfectly capable of granting a blanket, unconditional ex-
emption for an entire class of parties that might otherwise be exposed
to liability for infringing rights granted under the PVPA. Section 2545
provides that "[transportation or delivery by a carrier in the ordinary
course of its business as a carrier, or advertising by a person in the
advertising business in the ordinary course of that business, shall not
constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this
178 H.R. REP. No. 91-1605, at 11 (1970); accord Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers
Corp., 177 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
179 Sinkers, 177 F.3d at 1351.
180 See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349,
§§ 14(a), 15, 108 Stat. 3136, 3144, 3145; Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179,
184 n.2 (1995) (acknowledging the 1994 amendments and the inapplicability of the
pre-1994 version of the crop exemption to sales made after the 1994 amendments).
181 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1983)
(emphasis added); accord Sinkers, 177 F.3d at 1348.
182 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) ("In construing provi-
sions . . . in which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we
usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the
provision."); Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (observing that exemp-
tions from the Fair Labor Standards Act should be narrowly construed).
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chapter."1 3 The PVPA's broad exemption for common carriers dem-
onstrates that Congress knows how to create categorical exemptions
when it wishes to do so.' 8 4 The interpretive maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius seems especially apt. l8 5 The PVPA's research exemp-
tion is not absolute, but rather limited to those parties who approach
the statute-and proprietary plant varieties-with clean hands. A
party wishing to invoke the PVPA's research exemption must engage
in bona fide research intended to yield new plant varieties.
The research exemption, in addition, should be construed in pari
materia with the PVPA's definition of the scope of the breeder's right
and its definition of infringement.18 6 A plant variety certificate enti-
tes its holder "to exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it
for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it, or using it
in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different
variety therefrom."18 7 In the absence of a statutory exemption, the
use of unlawfully secured samples of proprietary seed to develop a
competing plant variety would violate the PVPA: "Except as otherwise
provided in this subchapter, it shall be an infringement of the rights
of the owner of a protected variety to... use the variety in producing
(as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety there-
from."' 88 The phrase, "producing (as distinguished from developing)
a hybrid or different variety therefrom," appears in haec verba not only
in the PVPA's definition of the breeder's right but also in the statute's
definition of infringement.
Hypothetically, a competitor may seek to dodge charges of PVPA
infringement by arguing that it has used a protected plant variety to
develop a hybrid or different variety rather than produce the protected
variety.' 8 9 Insofar as the unauthorized use of a protected variety to
183 7 U.S.C. § 2545 (2000).
184 See Sinkers, 177 F.3d at 1351 & n.6.
185 See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995) ("'Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that mat-
ters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.'" (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992))); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelli-
gence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); cf. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) ("Inclusio unius, exciusio alteius.").
186 For expressions of the interpretive canon counseling harmonious readings of
statutes in pari materia, see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-12
(1996); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138 n.11 (1985).
187 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(1).
188 Id. § 2541 (a) (4); cf Janis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 751 (treating the presence
of this language alongside the research exemption as "vexing").
189 See Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and Ownership of Genetically
Modified Organisms, 43 WASHBURN LJ. 611, 631 n.120 (2004).
[VOL. 8 1: 1
THE PARABLE OF THE SEEDS
"produc[e] (as distinguished from develop[ ]) a hybrid or different
variety" constitutes infringement of the breeder's exclusive rights
under the PVPA, 190 the statutory exemption for bona fide research
must be limited to the development of a derivative hybrid or of an
altogether new variety. The legislative history of the PVPA thought it
permissible to use a "protected variety as one source of germ plasm to
breed a novel variety." 191 By contrast, according to the House report
on the PVPA, the "use of [a] protected variety in producing the com-
mercial class of seed of [that] variety constitutes infringement."1 92
Neither the mere duplication of a true-to-type variety or the isolation
of chasing sefs to duplicate a proprietary hybrid fits the PVPA's
description of legally-protected, bona fide research activities. Instead,
simple duplication of a proprietary plant variety represents a classic
instance of PVPA infringement.
The PVPA's treatment of "essentially derived" varieties after its
1994 amendments should place a further limit on recourse to the stat-
ute's research exemption. The PVPA's definition of infringement cov-
ers "any variety that is essentially derived from a protected variety,
unless the protected variety is [itself] an essentially derived variety." 193
An "essentially derived variety" is "a variety that ... is predominantly
derived from another variety . . . or from a variety that is predomi-
nantly derived from the initial variety, while retaining the expression
of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combi-
nation of genotypes of the initial variety. ' 194 "[E]xcept for differences
that result from the act of derivation," an essentially derived variety
"conforms to the initial variety in the expression of the essential char-
acteristics that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes
of the initial variety." 19 5 The definition of an essentially derived vari-
ety also recognizes that "[a]n essentially derived variety may be ob-
tained by the selection of a natural or induced mutant or of a
somaclonal variant, the selection of a variant individual from plants of
the initial variety, backcrossing, transformation by genetic engineer-
ing, or other method."1 96 This definition draws further clarification
from the PVPA's requirement that all protected varieties be "distinct,
in the sense that the variety is clearly distinguishable from any other
variety the existence of which is publicly known or a matter of com-
190 7 U.S.C. § 2541 (a) (4).
191 H.R. REP. No. 91-1605, at 11 (1970).
192 Id.
193 7 U.S.C. § 2541 (c) (1).
194 Id. § 2401 (a) (3) (A) (i).
195 Id. § 2401(a) (3) (A) (iii).
196 Id. § 2401 (a) (3) (B).
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mon knowledge at the time of the filing of the application," 197 on the
basis of "one or more identifiable morphological, physiological, or
other characteristics (including any characteristics evidenced by
processing or product characteristics, such as milling and baking char-
acteristics in the case of wheat) with respect to which a difference in
genealogy may contribute evidence."' 98 A variety that could not satisfy
the statutory threshold of distinctiveness with respect to a preexisting
variety should not be construed as anything more than an essentially
derived variant. Despite some concerns that "the vague definition" of
essentially derived variety will invite litigation and thereby undermine
the ability of "the 1994 amendments [to] limit abuse of the research
exemption," the PVPA's provisions on essentially derived varieties sug-
gest that Congress intended "to disallow breeders from free-riding on
others' research investments," especially when subsequent breeders
have added nothing but "slight cosmetic changes" to a protected
variety.
199
The PVPA's research exemption appears to have grown from a
romantic vision of innovation. In many innovative contexts, the crea-
tive process involves numerous players, each of them freely exchang-
ing incremental creative steps. After sufficient iterations of this game,
it becomes impossible to tell where the creative process begins and
ends, to distinguish inventor from infringer. When innovative acts fol-
low each other as if they were so many pancakes in a stack, there is no
coherent way to identify one side as the "inventive" one.2 00 Agricul-
tural innovation is no stranger to this idyllic image. The romance of
farmers and land grant university researchers exchanging seeds for
the good of agriculture is entirely consistent with the dominant aca-
demic culture on matters of intellectual property.20 1 The reality is
considerably different. Contemporary plant breeding is a capital-in-
tensive enterprise, one in which seemingly modest differences in agro-
nomic performance shift enormous amounts of market share.
Though land grant universities and public agricultural research sta-
tions retain a significant role in advancing plant genetics, 202 farmers
197 Id. § 2402(a) (2).
198 Id. § 2401 (b) (5).
199 McEowen, supra note 189, at 631 n.120.
200 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997). See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoul-
ders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
201 See generally Farber, supra note 67; R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free:
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).
202 See generally PAUL W. HEISEY, C.S. SRINVASAN & COLIN THIRTLE, PUBLIC SECTOR
PLANT BREEDING IN A PRIVATIZING WORLD (2001); Gregory D. Graff et al., The Public-
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generally do not. Congress fashioned the PVPA's research exemption
out of an evident expectation that commercial plant breeders would,
true to the romantic view of crop improvement, use their competitors'
proprietary varieties as raw material for their own innovation. As a
rule, plant breeders who have exploited chasing selfs and other tech-
niques for reverse engineering their rivals' work have been content to
make knock-offs of proprietary varieties. An excessively romantic view
of the research exemption, far from encouraging an innovative renais-
sance in the American plant breeding industry, has the perverse effect
of inhibiting research in the first place.
D. Access to PVPA-Protected Seed
Even if the PVPA's research exemption could be interpreted to
authorize the unfettered use of proprietary seed in downstream
breeding programs, a more practical question remains. In order to
exploit the technology embedded within PVPA-protected seed, a com-
petitor must have access to that seed. There are two potential avenues
for access. First, a competing plant breeder can buy seed directly
from the PVPA certificate holder or an authorized sales agent. The
owner of a proprietary plant variety can obstruct this direct form of
access by erecting contractual and biological barriers. A breeder may
refuse to sell seed to a competitor. A breeder may also insist that all
seed sold by it be planted solely for nonreproductive purposes. The
lack of direct access to protected seed may push a competitor toward a
different, less obvious source. The PVPA requires applicants for plant
variety protection to deposit seeds or other reproductive material in a
public repository designated by the United States Department of Agri-
culture (USDA)*203 Samples so collected, if made available to the
public, would represent a source of genetic material beyond a
breeder's physical control and not subject to breeder-imposed con-
tractual limitations.
I shall now explore both channels of access, beginning with mate-
rial deposited in connection with PVPA applications. The PVPA does
not grant public access to this material. In like fashion, contractual
limitations on PVPA-protected seed are consistent with the statute and
should ordinarily be upheld.
Private Structure of Intellectual Property Ownership in Agricultural Biotechology, 21 NATURE
BIOTECH. 989, 990 (2003).
203 7 U.S.C. § 2422(4).
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1. Public Access to Seed Deposited in Connection with PVPA
Applications
The PVPA requires that "[a] n application for a certificate recog-
nizing plant variety rights shall contain .. . [a] declaration that a via-
ble sample of basic seed (including any propagating material)
necessary for propagation of the variety will be deposited and replen-
ished periodically in a public repository in accordance with regula-
tions to be established hereunder."20 4 According to the USDA
regulations implementing this provision, an applicant seeking a plant
variety protection certificate must submit "[a] t least 2,500 seeds of the
viable basic seed required to reproduce the variety, unless a waiver has
been granted for good cause. '20 5 Although this waiver provision ac-
commodates "instances where it is impractical or impossible for the
applicant to submit a sample of viable seeds," as when phytosanitary
restrictions on "the importation of seed could delay the submission of
a sample until the variety would no longer be eligible for protection,"
the availability of a waiver "is not intended to operate so that the cer-
tificate could be obtained without submitting the seed sample."20 6
These seeds must be stored in a public repository approved by the
Commissioner of Plant Variety Protection for the duration of the
certificate. 20
7
Hypothetically speaking, these seeds are a tempting target for
parties seeking to evade the contractual restrictions that are routinely
imposed on commercial seed. The Supreme Court, albeit merely in
passing, has declared that the public has no right to seeds deposited
in connection with applications for plant variety protection, at least
during any applicable term of protection. JE.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pio-
neer Hi-Bred International, Inc.20 8 observed that the PVPA "requires a
deposit of seed in a public depository... but neither the statute nor
the applicable regulation mandates that such material be accessible to
the general public during the term of the PVP certificate." 20 9 Closer
examination of the sources of law underlying this issue confirms the
validity of JE.M. Ag Supply's dictum: throughout the duration of a
PVPA certificate, seeds deposited in connection with an application
204 Id.
205 7 C.F.R. § 97.6(d)(1) (2005), amended ly Supplemental Fees, 70 Fed. Reg.
28,783 (Plant Variety Prot. Office May 19, 2005).
206 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,785.
207 7 C.F.R. § 97.6(d)(1).
208 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
209 Id. at 143.
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for that certificate should not be released by the repository for public
use without the applicant's consent.
The National Seed Storage Laboratory (NSSL) in Ft. Collins, Col-
orado, is the sort of public repository for seeds protected that the
PVPA contemplates. The NSSL is the crown jewel in the United
States' "diffuse network of laboratories and research stations" de-
signed to preserve the country's grip on plant genetic diversity.
210
Upon the expansion of the PVPA in 1994 to cover tuber-propagated
varieties and first-generation hybrids,21 1 the USDA made arrange-
ments to secure reproductive material for these varieties. In connec-
tion with an "application for a tuber propagated variety," the
Commissioner of Plant Variety Protection demands "a declaration
that a viable cell culture will be deposited in a public depository ap-
proved by the Commissioner and will be maintained for the duration
of the certificate." 212 This requirement is congruent with the statutory
definition of "[t]he term 'seed', [sic] with respect to a tuber propa-
gated variety, [as] the tuber or the part of the tuber used for propaga-
tion."213 With respect to "a hybrid from self-incompatible parents,"
the Commissioner seeks "a declaration that a plot of vegetative mate-
rial for each parent will be established in a public depository approved
by the Commissioner and will be maintained for the duration of the
certificate." 2
14
These formal PVPA regulations do not prescribe a specific proce-
dure governing seeds for true-to-type crops such as wheat, soybeans,
and cotton. Determining the legal treatment of this important cate-
gory of plant genetic material demands inspection of the Department
of Agriculture's inner workings. The PVPA establishes the Plant Vari-
ety Protection Office (PVPO) as a subdivision of the USDA.215 Ac-
cording to the PVPA, the PVPO "shall devote itself substantially
exclusively to the administration of this chapter."216 USDA regula-
tions and informal pronouncements by the PVPO bear heavily on the
210 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING GLOBAL GENETIC RESOURCES: THE
U.S. NATIONAL PLANT GERMPLASM SYSTEM 1 (1991) (describing the National Seed Stor-
age Laboratory as one of the Department of Agriculture's most important tools for
preserving germplasm diversity).
211 See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, § 3,
108 Stat. 3136, 3138-39 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2402).
212 7 C.F.R. § 97.6(d)(2), amended by Supplemental Fees, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,783
(Plant Variety Prot. Office May 19, 2005).
213 7 U.S.C. § 2401 (a) (5).
214 7 C.F.R. § 97.6(d) (3), amended by 70 Fed. Reg. 28,783.
215 7 U.S.C. § 2323 (providing that the organization of the PVPO "shall, except as
provided herein, be determined by the Secretary of Agriculture").
216 Id.
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interpretation of the PVPA's requirement that applicants for plant va-
riety protection deposit reproductive material in a public repository.
Through its website and other casual publications, the PVPO
sometimes renders informal interpretations of the PVPA. The "Fre-
quently Asked Questions" section of the PVPO's website outlines the
agency's approach to seeds for true-to-type crops:
A small sample (less than 25 seeds) may be kept by the examiner to
assist in the examination process. This sample is destroyed once
examination is complete and the sample is no longer needed.
The bulk of the seed sample serves as a voucher specimen, for
PVPO's use should a question ever arise about the validity of the
description. The sample is sent to the National Seed Storage Labora-
tory in Ft. Collins, Colorado. The memorandum of understanding be-
tween PVPO and NSSL states that these seed samples will be kept
separate from their general collection during the term of PVPO pro-
tection. When received by NSSL, their staff count the seeds in the
sample and test it for germination rate. If the sample is too small in
size or too low in germination, they report that to the PVP Office.
PVPO then requests seed replenishment. (This process is repeated
periodically during the examination and protection periods. There-
fore, we always need to know how to contact the applicant (or owner)
in case a seed replenishment is needed.) The seed sample is then
placed in long-term storage, according to practices established by
NSSL. 2
17
The PVPO's website also makes it clear that seeds deposited in a
public depository are not accessible to the public as long as those
seeds are protected by a plant variety certificate:
While the application [for a plant variety protection certificate] is
being processed and continuing through the term of protection
(20-25 years), only the PVPO has access to the seed sample. We
would only need access when a question arises about the validity or
accurracy [sic] of the variety description. If the application is ineli-
gible or denied, or if it is abandoned or withdrawn by the applicant,
then the seed sample is destroyed or returned to the applicant and
again is not available to others. When an issued certificate expires
(for any reason), then the seed sample is transferred to NSSL's gen-
eral collection and can be requested by others.
2 18
Informal statements by the PVPO provide persuasive (albeit not
conclusive or binding) evidence of the meaning of the PVPA. The
217 Plant Variety Protection Office-FAQ (Seed Sample), http://www.ams.usda.
gov/science/pvpo/FAQ/seedsamples.htm#others (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
218 Id.
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PVPO's online answers to "Frequently Asked Questions" do not rest
on any specific statutory authorization or result from a legally rigorous
rulemaking process. The PVPA merely authorizes the Secretary of Ag-
riculture to "establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
conduct of proceedings in the Plant Variety Protection Office after
consultations with the Plant Variety Protection Board. ' 219 This au-
thorization cannot be plausibly interpreted as exempting USDA from
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) provisions
governing notice-and-comment rulemaking. The PVPO's informal ex-
ercises in statutory interpretation simply do not comply with the APA's
procedures formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
In the 2000 case of Christensen v. Harris County,220 the Supreme Court
observed that interpretions not "arrived at after, for example, a formal
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking" 221 do not warrant
the broad judicial deference otherwise prescribed by Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 222 "Interpretations such as
those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy state-
ments, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack
the force of law-do not warrant [broad judicial] deference. '223 Nev-
ertheless, "given the specialized experience and broader information
available to ... an agency, these informal interpretations are 'entitled
to respect' to the extent that they have the 'power to persuade.' ,
224
Therefore, informal interpretations of the PVPA "may merit some def-
erence whatever their form, given the 'specialized experience and
broader investigations and information' available to" the PVPO and
the USDA at large "and given the value of uniformity in its administra-
tive and judicial understandings of what a national law requires.
2 25
The assumption that members of the public may obtain access to
protected seed on deposit has no support in the PVPA, the statute's
implementing regulations, or any other source of law. USDA regula-
tions do provide that an applicant for a plant variety protection certifi-
219 7 U.S.C. § 2326.
220 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
221 Id. at 587.
222 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)); see also Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649, 656 (7th
Cir. 2001) ("[W]hen the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to an issue before
the court, the court should defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.").
223 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
224 Am. Fed'n, 262 F.3d at 656 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
225 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)); accord, e.g., Old Ben Coal Co. v. Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 542 (7th Cir. 2002).
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cate may be "required by the examiner to furnish representative
specimens of the variety, or its flower, fruit, or seeds, in a quantity and
at a specified stage of growth," but only "as may be necessary to verify
the statements in the application. '" 226 Neither the USDA nor any
other legal authority suggests that deposits of protected reproductive
material at the NSSL may be made available to the USDA, let alone to
the general public, for any other purpose. Indeed, the PVPA's imple-
menting regulations clearly and pointedly provide that " [p] lant speci-
mens submitted in support of an application shall not be removed
from the [Plant Variety Protection] Office except by an employee of
the Office or other person authorized by the Secretary. ' 227 Once all
plant specimens submitted to the PVPO "have served their intended
purpose," the regulations allow an applicant to request that those
materials be "returned . . . at his or her expense."228 Only "upon a
finding of good cause" may the "Commissioner ... require that cer-
tain specimens be retained in the Office for indefinite periods of
time."229 Otherwise, "[s]pecimens which are not returned or not re-
tained as provided above shall be destroyed." 230 Read as a whole,
these regulations strongly suggest that seed deposits are to be used
solely by the government and strictly for the purpose of determining
the merits of an application for plant variety protection.
To be sure, there is some tension between the PVPA's implement-
ing regulations and the "Frequently Asked Questions" section of the
PVPO's website. According to the PVPO's website, a deposited seed
sample does become available to the public once "an issued certificate
expires (for any reason)."231 Upon the expiration of a certificate, the
previously protected "seed sample is transferred to NSSL's general col-
lection and can be requested by others." 232 The constitutional inter-
est in eventual transfer of federally-protected intellectual property to
the public domain may dictate public access to PVPA-protected plant
material upon the expiration of a plant variety certificate. Seeds and
tubers, of their own accord, represent the enabling disclosure that
plant breeders must make in order to qualify for rights conferred
under the authority of the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause.
Deposited reproductive material, once made available to the public,
communicates the technical information that would enable the even-
226 7 C.F.R. § 97.8(a) (2005).
227 Id. § 97.8(b).
228 Id. § 97.8(c).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Plant Variety Protection Office-FAQ (Seed Sample), supra note 217.
232 Id.
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tual duplication of each plant breeder's efforts. That disclosure in
turn represents "the quid pro quo" demanded by the public in ex-
change for "the right to exclude," the implicit social payment for intel-
lectual property protection over a limited term.
233
From a competing breeder's point of view, however, the real
prize is access to deposited seeds before the expiration of a plant variety
certificate. There simply is no legal basis for this purported right.
Neither the USDA's PVPA regulations nor their preamble hints that
the public might have access to deposited seed before the expiration
of a PVPA certificate. At most, the USDA has remarked that "the re-
quirement that the application must be accompanied by a seed sam-
ple" has been revised so that an application for protection of "a tuber
propagated variety . . . [will] be accompanied by 'verification that a
viable cell culture will be deposited in a public depository before the
issuance of the certificate and will be maintained for the duration of
the certificate.' "234 At the same time, the USDA has acknowledged,
with respect to sexually reproduced plants, that "seed samples provide
information on seed characteristics and demonstrate the uniformity
of the deposit," insofar as "[n] o such information is gained from a cell
culture."23 5 The legislative history of the PVPA makes it clear that the
deposit requirement is intended to preserve the viability of the
variety.
23 6
Even if the requirement to deposit seeds in connection with an
application for a plant variety protection certificate could somehow be
construed as entitling members of the public to receive free access to
deposited seeds, sound principles of statutory interpretation counsel
strongly against this reading of the PVPA and its implementing regula-
tions. When government compels the submission of proprietary data
otherwise protected by state trade secret laws, compulsory disclosure
233 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) (describing this
arrangement as the essential social bargain embodied in the patent laws); accord
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
234 Plant Variety Protection Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,188, 17,188 (Apr. 4,
1995), amended by Supplemental Fees, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,783 (Plant Variety Prot. Office
May 19, 2005); see also 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,785 (amending 7 C.F.R. § 97.6(d)) ("Be-
cause of the expense of depositing cell cultures and because cell cultures are not useful in
the examination process, the PVP Office has granted exceptions to applicants so that the
cell culture need not be deposited until the examination has been completed." (em-
phasis added)).
235 60 Fed. Reg. at 17,188.
236 See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 99 Before the Sub-
comm. on Department Investigations, Oversight, and Research of the H. Comm. on Agriculture,
96th Cong. 83 (1980) (statement of Bernard M. Leese, Jr., Comm'r, Plant Variety
Protection, Agricultural Marketing Service); Janis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 748.
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of the information at issue to other parties destroys the owner's valued
interest in retaining his or her "right to exclude others."237 In light of
the Fifth Amendment's promise that "private property" shall not "be
taken for public use, without just compensation," the USDA should
not demand the delivery of seed samples to the NSSL as a condition of
plant variety protection with the intent of granting public access to
those seeds, especially for reproductive purposes.
238
An aggrieved party would not necessarily have to establish that
interpreting the PVPA to compel public access to deposited seed
would actually violate the Constitution. What matters is that such an
interpretation would raise serious constitutional doubts. 23 9 Given the
choice, a court should construe the PVPA and its implementing regu-
lations not to permit public access to deposited, proprietary seed dur-
ing the term of statutory protection. The avowed purpose of the
PVPA is to "afford adequate encouragement for research ... to yield
for the public the benefits of new varieties." 240 The presence of this
statutory aspiration makes it extraordinary to construe the PVPA and
its implementing regulations so that the public could freely acquire
samples of proprietary seed deposited at the NSSL in connection with
an application for plant variety protection.
Indeed, the presumptive unavailability of deposited seeds repre-
sents one respect in which the PVPA appears to grant more generous
protection to plant breeders than would be available through a utility
patent. Whereas the regulations implementing the patent laws permit
237 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (recognizing a prop-
erty right in trade secret data submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency in
connection with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA));
see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985) (validat-
ing a scheme for compensating the owners of trade secrets that are used by follow-on
applicants under FIFRA).
238 U.S. CONST. amend. V; cf Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(holding that a state zoning commission could not, without paying compensation,
condition the grant of permission to rebuild a house on beachfront property upon
the owner's cession of a public easement across that property).
239 See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (holding that the NLRB's construction of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act was not entitled to deference to the extent that its interpre-
tation posed a serious question of the provision's validity under the First
Amendment); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1979) (finding
"serious constitutional questions" concerning the exercise of NLRBjurisdiction over a
church-affiliated school); cf Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (counseling reliance on nonconstitutional bases for rendering a deci-
sion, whenever available, over constitutional approaches to adjudication).
240 7 U.S.C. § 2581 (2000).
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public access to samples of patented biological material,241 neither the
PVPA nor its regulations appear to contemplate access of this sort.
Although the PVPA "requires a deposit of seed in a public depository,
... neither the statute nor the applicable regulation mandates that
such material be accessible to the general public during the term of
the PVP certificate." 242 Statutory and regulatory silence seems disposi-
tive. The presumptive unavailability of proprietary seed deposits at
the NSSL throughout the term of protection represents one of those
instances in which "the fact that the dog did not bark can itself be
[legally] significant.
'243
At a certain level, it may seem tempting to construe the PVPA and
the Patent Act in pari materia with respect to the issue of public access
to biological material deposited in connection with an application for
proprietary protection. Against the backdrop of the Patent Act's well
established approach of permitting access, the silent PVPA arguably
should be interpreted to permit a similar degree of access. This su-
perficially appealing argument ignores fundamental differences be-
tween the PVPA and the Patent Act. The Patent Act demands an
extensive disclosure from any patent applicant and delivers compre-
hensive protection to those applicants who successfully secure a pat-
ent. By contrast, the PVPA requests much less information from its
applicants. Samples of biological material do not merely verify a
PVPA application; in a very meaningful sense, they affirmatively re-
present the plant breeder's disclosure of its invention. Possession of
protected samples enables any person trained in the art to duplicate
and capture a plant breeder's innovation. Releasing those samples
before the expiration of a PVPA certificate would seriously undermine
the holder's proprietary interest without delivering a corresponding
increase in the public's scientific understanding.
Differences in the two statutes' enforcement mechanisms are also
dispositive. Downstream infringement of patent rights in biological
material can be swiftly and thoroughly punished. The presence of a
patented plant's telltale DNA in seed sold by a competing breeder or
241 See Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (E.D. Mo. 2003); 37
C.F.R. § 1.801-809 (2005).
242 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143 (2001)
(citing 7 C.F.R. § 97.6 (2001)).
243 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 589 (1982) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); accord Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991); see also Harrison v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In a case
where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so
relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives
may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.").
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within seed hoarded or peddled by a farmer provides fairly stark evi-
dence of infringement. For instance, in a case involving alleged in-
fringement of three patents on Monsanto's Roundup Ready@ and
Bollgard® pesticide-resistance technology, the application of "three
separate testing procedures on the [disputed] cotton and soybean
crops" exposed the presence of the "patented gene technology in 93%
of the cotton samples and 100% of the soybean samples."244 Coupled
with the defendant's admitted failure ever to sign a licensing agree-
ment covering Monsanto's Roundup Ready® and Bollgard® patents,
these tests pointed unequivocally to an instance of patent infringe-
ment: "The only conclusion to be drawn from the results of the testing
is that Defendant was clearly using Plaintiff's patented technology in
his cotton and soybean crops for the 2000 season.... Therefore, De-
fendant infringed on Plaintiff's patent by using its patented technol-
ogy without authorization. '24
5
Although DNA testing can also identify PVPA-protected plants,
that statute's research and crop exemptions cloud the clarity of the
legal conclusion that can be drawn from the presence of a proprietary
DNA signature. Unlike the Patent Act, the PVPA privileges certain
uses of proprietary plant varieties by a certificate holder's customers
and business rivals, the very parties who are likeliest to violate the stat-
ute. The differences between these statutes suggest a general rule re-
garding the relationship between the strength of an intellectual
property scheme and the government's degree of discretion in per-
mitting public access to proprietary technology during the term of
protection. More robust protection of intellectual property enables
244 Monsanto Co. v. Trantham, 156 F. Supp. 2d 855, 859 (W.D. Tenn. 2001). The
court detailed the technology by which Monsanto tested the disputed seeds:
The [cotton and soybean] samples were... transferred for testing to Denise
Breimeir at Biolab Solutions. At Biolab, Ms. Breimeir subjected 75 samples
of Defendant's cotton plant leaves to assay by enzyme link immunosorbent
assay ("ELISA") to detect the presence of CRY1A(c) protein produced by
Bollgard® Cotton. The ELISA testing showed that 93% of the cotton sam-
ples produced the CRY1A(c) protein. Dr. Pang then tested 17 cottonseeds
from bolls of cotton taken from Defendant's land by extracting the DNA
from the seeds and using a polymerase chain reaction method ("PCR") to
determine whether the transgene insertion region for the Bollgard® gene
was present in the cottonseeds. In addition, the seeds were assayed for the
presence of tandemly duplicated CaMV35S enhancer sequence. Finally, the
PCR products from the PCR testing were subjected to restriction endonucle-
ase analysis which demonstrated that the CaMV35S enhancer sequence that
expresses the CRY1A(c) protein was present in the seeds.
Id. at 868.
245 Id.
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the government to permit greater access to biological samples and
other materials that have the potential to foster infringement, espe-
cially before the rights in question expire.
2. Contractual Restrictions on the Use of PVPA-Protected Seed
Plant breeders routinely require purchasers of PVPA-protected
seed to waive their statutory rights under the PVPA's crop and re-
search exemptions through "seed-wrap" or "bag-tag" licenses printed
on or attached to a bag of seed.2 46 This is an instance of using con-
tract as a means of privately securing rights akin to those ordinarily
conferred through intellectual property legislation or, as may be true
in the context of PVPA-protected seed, restoring the breeder's control
over plant genetic information. 247 Seed-wrap licenses routinely pro-
hibit the "[r]esale of ... seed or supply of saved seed to anyone, in-
cluding [the] [p]urchaser, for planting"; the "[u]se of [the] product,
or the parental lines used in producing [the] product, for use in de-
velopment or breeding"; and the use of "any parental seed that might
be unintentionally contained . . . for purposes . . . [other than]
produc [tion of] forage, or grain for feeding or processing."2 48 These
provisions, if valid, would effectively strip a purchaser of PVPA-pro-
tected seed of rights shielded under the statute's crop and research
exemptions.
Dan L. Burk has suggested that the PVPA's research and crop
exemptions "might abrogate seed-wrap terms that would frustrate the
intent of such statutory provisions." 249 Professor Burk's suggestion,
admittedly made in passing and without extensive analysis, does not
withstand close legal scrutiny. Plant breeders may impose seed-wrap
contracts even in the absence of plant variety protection; " [i] t is possi-
ble to establish these license agreements based on trade secret or util-
246 See Burk, supra note 15, at 1557-58; Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Shaping Soci-
ety's Acceptance of Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms, 6 DRAK J. AGRIc. L.
81 (2001); Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own the Farm If You Can Own the Farmer (and the
Crop)?: Contract Production and Intellectual Protection of Grain Crops, 73 NEB. L. REv. 48,
90-92 (1994).
247 SeeJ.H. Reichman &Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L.
REv. 875 (1999).
248 Janis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 772 (quoting a "representative example of the
key licensing restrictions in a bag-tag license"); see also Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v.
Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1045-46 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (quoting
similar language).
249 Burk, supra note 15, at 1569.
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ity patent protection for the plant varieties" at issue.250 The scope of
protection available under the PVPA falls roughly between the protec-
tive levels of trade secret and patent. If seed-wrap contracts are valid
when based on trade secret or patent, they should be valid a fortiori
when the underlying genetic information is protected under the
PVPA.
The baseline established by trade secret law is especially re-
vealing, since the validity of seed-wrap contracts that shield this
weaker form of intellectual property should provide a safe harbor for
seed-wrap licensing under the PVPA. "[G]enetic messages" such as
those coded within high-yielding or pesticide-resistant seeds have
been presumed suitable "for trade secret status."2 5' The threshold for
qualifying for protection under trade secret law is putatively lower
than that of the PVPA and certainly lower than that of patent law.
Trade secret law's requirement of secrecy need not meet patent law's
requirement of "novelty" or an "inventive step";252 even where no pat-
ent could issue, trade secret protection may be available.255 Most sig-
nificantly, the law of trade secrets offers no protection against reverse
engineering. "A trade secret law," generally speaking, "does not offer
protection against discovery by fair and honest means."25 4 Later inno-
vators may freely exploit "independent invention, accidental disclo-
sure, or ... so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the
known product and working backward to divine the process which
aided in its development or manufacture.
'" 255
In the abstract, the exploitation of chasing selfs to isolate the in-
bred parent lines of a hybrid variety may constitute either an instance
of permitted reverse engineering or an infringement of a trade secret.
If the use of chasing selfs "is deemed to be an act of uncovering the
trade secret through legitimate, publicly available means, it may fit
250 Janis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 773.
251 Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc. v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1235
(8th Cir. 1994) ("assum[ing] without deciding" this legal proposition); see alsoJeffrey
J. Wolf, Note, The "Genetic Message" from the Cornfields of Iowa: Expanding the Law of
Trade Secrets, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 631 (1988-1989).
252 See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9, 14 (6th Cir. 1968); cf Doris
Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Prop-
erty Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 277 (1998) (arguing that folk
knowledge rarely exhibits the sort of inventive step that patent law demands).
253 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265-66 (1979).
254 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
255 Id. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Econom-
ics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
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within the scope of permissible reverse engineering. '" 256 On the other
hand, if this technique "is characterized as taking advantage of a mis-
taken or accidental disclosure of the secret, where all reasonable pre-
cautions against disclosure were taken, then trade secret protection
might be preserved." 257 A prominent federal appellate decision ap-
pears to have resolved this issue in favor of trade secret holders. In
Pioneer Hi-Bred International v. Holden Foundation Seeds, Inc.,258 a 1994
decision that is probably the leading case on trade secret protection of
hybrid seed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
concluded that "efforts [to] search[ 'friendly farms' for stray inbred
plants" constituted the sort of misappropriation that supported a mer-
itorious trade secret claim.259 By this baseline, the violation of con-
tractual terms explicitly barring a seed purchaser from using seed for
downstream breeding should readily support a trade secret claim.
In casting doubt on the validity of seed-wrap contracts that force
waiver of the PVPA's crop and research exemptions, Professor Burk
relies heavily on an analogy to the patent misuse doctrine. 260 The pat-
ent misuse doctrine is designed "to prevent a patentee from using [a]
patent to obtain market benefit beyond that which inheres in the stat-
utory patent right. '2 6 1 For instance, patent law forbids "bald at-
tempt[s]" to extend the exclusivity period of a patent through
contracts purporting "to exact the same terms and conditions" as the
statutory grant.2 62 The problem with Professor Burk's suggestion is
that it flies squarely in the face of the Federal Circuit's definitive reso-
lution of the issue. In a pair of cases, both styled Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling,263 the Federal Circuit ruled against a farmer who had saved
patented Roundup Ready® soybean seed and planted it in a subse-
quent growing season in violation of Monsanto's licensing agreement.
256 Mark D. Janis, Intellectual Property Issues in Plant Breeding and Plant Biotechnology,
in BIOTECHNOLOGY, GENE FLOW, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 7 (Marshall A.
Martin ed., 2002).
257 Id.
258 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994).
259 Id. at 1239.
260 See Burk, supra note 15, at 1569.
261 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992); accord
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 30-31 (1931); Senza-Gel
Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
262 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964) (declaring contracts of this sort
"unlawful per se").
263 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (McFarling I), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3075
(U.S. June 27, 2005) (No. 04-31); 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (McFarling I), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1232 (2003).
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In the 2002 case of McFarling I, Homan McFarling, a Mississippi
soybean farmer, attacked the licensing agreement as "an illegal tying
arrangement" that "requir[ed] farmers to buy new Roundup Ready®
seed each year instead of allowing them to produce their own
Roundup Ready® seed from the prior year's crop."2 6 4 No tying ar-
rangement existed, the Federal Circuit held, insofar as the licensing
agreement did not "prevent[ ] Mr. McFarling from switching to other
soybean seeds" among the "over two hundred commercial sources of
soybean seed, including several herbicide-resistant soybeans. '265 As a
federal district court applying McFarland I characterized this holding,
farmers who purchase patented seed subject to a licensing agreement
prohibiting the replanting of saved seed "are not in the position of [a]
new-car purchaser obliged to purchase a new car every year."
266
"Rather," such farmers "are in the position of a car-lessor crying foul
upon discovering he cannot retain the car after his lease expires."
267
Nor did the licensing agreement violate patent law's "first sale" doc-
trine268 insofar as McFarling never sold "the new seeds grown from
the original batch" of Roundup Ready® soybeans. 269 In a very similar
contemporaneous dispute, a federal district court squarely held in
2001 that a single-use licensing agreement falls "within the scope of
[a] patent grant" on herbicide resistance technology and that patent
law's "doctrine of exhaustion does not bar [a] suit for infringement
[where] the sale of ... patented gene technology is expressly condi-
tioned on the signing of [a] restrictive licensing agreement that pro-
hibits the saving of seed and restricts the use of the seed to a single
growing season." 270 Perhaps most devastatingly, McFarling I flatly re-
jected the argument that the PVPA's crop exemption, "which permits
farmers to save seeds of plants registered under" that statute, vitiates
"contractual prohibition[s] against using .. .patented seed to pro-
duce new seed for planting."27 1 The Federal Circuit held "that the
right to save seed ... under the PVPA does not impart the right to
save seed . . . under the Patent Act."
272
264 McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1297.
265 Id. at 1298.
266 Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
267 Id.
268 See generally United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
269 McFarling 1, 302 F.3d at 1299.
270 Monsanto Co. v. Trantham, 156 F. Supp. 2d 855, 870 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
271 McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1299.
272 Id.; see also McFarling II, 363 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S.June 27, 2005) (No. 04-31) ("Congress did not intend to prohibit
owners of utility patents from enforcing seed-saving prohibitions in their licenses.").
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Decided in 2004, McFarling II elaborated McFarling's charge of
patent misuse through unlawful tying. Reformulating his tying claim
as one "centerled] on his desire to replant the entire seed" derived
from the original bag of Roundup Ready® soybeans "and on Mon-
santo's refusal to grant him permission to do so," McFarling proposed
a remedy that would allow farmers to "save and replant ROUNDUP
READY® seed each year" upon payment of a technology fee in lieu of
the existing arrangement by which farmers "purchase both the seed
and the genetic technology together at the beginning of each growing
season."273 This argument, if credited, would establish "a compulsory
license to use the patent rights in conjunction with... second-genera-
tion ROUNDUP READY® soybeans."274 McFarling II "decline [d] to
hold that Monsanto's raw exercise of its right to exclude from the
patented invention by itself [was] an impermissible "'tying' arrange-
ment that exceeds the scope of the patent grant."275 Although the
court stopped short of holding that the licensing agreement imposed
"permissible field-of-use restrictions on the first-generation seeds," 276
it did sustain the saved seed prohibition on the reasoning that Mon-
santo's Roundup Ready® patent would embrace "all generations of
soybeans produced. '" 277 Any restriction "prohibiting the replanting
of" any subsequent "generation of ROUNDUP READY® soybeans"
would accordingly "not extend Monsanto's rights under the patent
statute." 27
8
The McFarling decisions leave just enough room for one last-ditch
argument. Opponents of seed-wrap licensing might argue that the
PVPA should preempt contractual limitations purporting to strip pur-
chasers of PVPA-protected seed of their rights under that statute's
crop and research exemptions. 279 The Patent Act, after all, does not
privilege the saving of seed or its use in developing (as distinguished
from producing) new plant varieties. Seed-wrap contracts on pat-
ented seed deprive purchasers of no privilege they would have en-
joyed under the Patent Act. The almost certain validity of seed-wrap
273 McFarlingII, 363 F.3d at 1342.
274 Id.; see also id. at 1344 ("McFarling is not alleging that he is unable to, or even
that he desires to, purchase a 'natural' soybean seed and the ROUNDUP READY®
genetic trait as distinct items; he alleges only that Monsanto refuses to grant him a
license to use . . . second-generation . . . seeds . . . in his preferred manner.").
275 Id. at 1342.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1343.
278 Id.
279 See Burk, supra note 15, at 1570-71; cf McEowen, supra note 189, at 644 n.196
(suggesting that "the antitrust arguments made by the farmer[ ] in ... McFarlingwere
not fully developed").
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contracts on plant varieties protected solely under trade secret law,
however, undermines this argument. Trade secret law typically enti-
ties competitors to engage in the very sort of reverse engineering that
often represents the first step in PVPA infringement (especially when
competitors use the chasing sefs technique to expose a hybrid vari-
ety's inbred parent lines). At least in Iowa and in any other state with
a comparable approach to trade secrets, the Eighth Circuit's Holden
decision leaves little doubt that a seed-wrap license would strip this
right to experiment from a purchaser of seed protected solely under
the law of trade secrets. Interpreting the PVPA in a way inconsistent
with Holden and McFarling would merely encourage plant breeders ei-
ther to seek patents rather than PVPA certificates or, far worse, to
forgo both federal systems of protection in favor of trade secret law.
Because the law of trade secrets, by design, keeps information con-
cealed, it represents an exceptionally poor vehicle for delivering infor-
mation of any sort into the public domain. Interpreting a law enacted
under Congress's authority to "secur[e] for limited Times ... the ex-
clusive Right to . . .Writings and Discoveries" in such a debilitating
way that "Authors and Inventors" have a greater incentive to keep
their innovations secret represents a profound perversion of the con-
stitutional command to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." 2 8 0
THE PARABLE OF THE SOWER
"For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a
scripture."28' The story of the American republic is in essence an
agrarian epic. In a nation that "was born in the country and has
moved to the city,"28 2 the well worn "path from barnyard to suburb"
has become "the dominant [historical] narrative." 28 3 This country is
everything from "the slice of a continent" to "a group of holding com-
panies, some aggregations of trade unions, a set of laws bound in calf,
a radio network, a chain of moving picture theatres."28 4 "But mostly
U. S. A. is the speech of the people."28 5 The idiom by which the
American people "know in part, and... prophesy in part"28 6 assuredly
takes its rhythm and cadence from the "vast obscurity" beyond
280 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
281 Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
282 PicHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: BRYAN TO FDR 23 (1955).
283 Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1767 (2003).
284 JOHN Dos PAssos, U.S.A. 2 (Library of America 1996) (1937).
285 Id. at 3.
286 I Corinthians 13:9 (King James Version).
[VOL. 81:1
THE PARABLE OF THE SEEDS
America's cities and "the dark fields of the republic roll[ing] on
under the night."
2 7
Within the grand narrative of American law and history, agricul-
ture has played a prominent role. The USDA-which remains this
nation's only Cabinet-level office dedicated to the welfare of a specific
industry-was originally commissioned "to acquire and to diffuse
among the people of the United States useful information on subjects
connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive
sense of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among
the people new and valuable seeds and plants."288 Plant variety pro-
tection represents a crucial component of this agenda. The PVPA
should be interpreted so as not to destroy that statute's overarching
purpose, that of "afford[ing] adequate encouragement for re-
search . . . to yield for the public the benefits of new varieties. '2 89
Only through the imposition of legally meaningful limits, both on ac-
cess to reproductive material deposited in connection with applica-
tions for plant variety protection and on the PVPA's statutory
exemptions, can the interpretation and application of this law be kept
from "undercut[ting] . . . the PVPA's incentives" for innovation by
plant breeders. 290
As matters stand, the PVPA appears to have provided at most
modest incentives for private investment in agricultural research and
development.291 Nor does the PVPA appear to have generated signifi-
cant improvements in crop quality, crop yields, or any other measure
of agronomic performance.2 92 Thanks to the astounding scope of the
PVPA's crop exemption before 1994, withering competition from
287 F. ScoTr FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 141 (MatthewJ. Bruccoli ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1991) (1925).
288 Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, § 1, 12 Stat. 387, 387 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 2201 (2000)). Later amendments expanded the Department's mission to
include rural development, see Rural Development Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-419,
§ 603(a), 86 Stat. 657, 675, and aquaculture and human nutrition, see Food and Agri-
culture Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 1502(a), 91 Stat. 913, 1021. See generally
GLADYS BAKER ET AL., CENTURY OF SERVICE: THE FIRST 100 YEARS OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (1963).
289 7 U.S.C. § 2581.
290 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486, 491 (Fed. Cir. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, 513 U.S. 179 (1995); accord Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co.,
694 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1983).
291 See JULIAN M. ALSTON & RAYMOND J. VENNER, INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH
INST., THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT ON WHEAT GENETIC
IMPROVEMENT 31 (2000), available at http://www.grain.org/docs/eptdp62.pdf; KLoP-
PENBURG, supra note 12, at 140-50; Janis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 775-76.
292 See sources cited supra note 291.
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brown-bag sales prompted commercial plant breeders to shift their
research from self-pollinated crops to hybrids.293 Unlike self-pol-
linated and tuber-propagated plants, hybrids enjoy a biological immu-
nity from easy duplication. 29 4 This distortion of agricultural research
brings with it a lamentable preference for the law of trade secrets over
the PVPA and patent law. Whatever their flaws, federal intellectual
property laws boast the singular virtue of forcing inventions into the
public domain once their terms of protection expire.
Moreover, to the extent that breeders do continue work on self-
pollinated and tuber-propagated plants, further weakening of the
PVPA will enhance their incentives to develop technologies control-
ling plant gene expression. 295 Genetic Use Restriction Technologies
(GURTs) such as the hotly controversial Technology Protection Sys-
tem 296 are likely to proliferate in response to the perceived weakness
of statutory and contractual means for protecting plant breeders' in-
vestments in research and development. Though a full discussion of
293 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 102D CONG., BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 109 (1991); Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner Evolving Legal Mechanisms
for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 587, 639 (1993); cf Mary K Knud-
son & Vernon W. Ruttan, Research and Development of a Biological Innovation: Commercial
Hybrid Wheat, 21 FOOD RES. INST. STUD. 45 (1988) (predicting the shift from self-pol-
linating to hybrid crops before the controversy over brown-bag sales and the PVPA's
crop exemption reached its apex).
294 See P. Stephen Baenziger et al., Breeding Pure Line Cultivars, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PLANT AND CROP SCIENCE, supra note 164, at 196, 196.
295 See F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 307,
318-19 (2002).
296 See Control of Plant Gene Expression, U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765 (filed Mar. 3,
1998). The other patents, Nos. 5,925,808 and 5,977,441, were also named "Control of
Plant Gene Expression." These patents belong jointly to the Department of Agricul-
ture and to the Delta and Pine Land Company. Although critics of the Technology
Protection System almost uniformly call it "terminator" technology, I will eschew that
inflammatory and misleading moniker. Patrick Mooney, executive director of the Ru-
ral Advancement Foundation International, appears to have coined the mocking
nickname preferred by almost all opponents of plant gene expression control tech-
nology: the "terminator." See Bill Lambrecht, Critics Vilify New Seed Technology That
Monsanto May Soon Control-'Terminator' Would Prevent Saving Seeds by Making Them Ster-
ile, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 1998, at Al. I endorse Dan Burk's decision "to
avoid this nomenclature," which carries "certain rhetorical implications that are un-
helpful to serious analysis of the technology's impact" and which creates confusion
with the use of the term "terminator" in molecular biology to "refer[ ] to a specific
type of genetic control sequence that is not employed in GURTs." Burk, supra note
15, at 1558 n.20 (citing the description of RNA terminator control sequences inJAMES
D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 377-78 (4th ed. 1987)).
[VOL. 8 1: 1
2005] THE PARABLE OF THE SEEDS 157
GURTs lies beyond the scope of this Article, 2 9 7 the very existence of
research funds invested in their development, elaboration, and de-
ployment is evidence of legal failure. Resources devoted to the en-
forcement of legal rights are spent at the expense of actual
innovation.
298
As currently configured, the PVPA has fallen short of its lofty aspi-
ration to spur innovation in plant breeding. The ceiling on the
PVPA's success is most fairly attributed to the statute's "limited" scope
of protection, the ease with which the statute can be circumvented,
and the presence of the research and crop exemptions. 299 The PVPA
thus represents a rare instance in the annals of contemporary intellec-
tual property law in which proprietary protection is not excessive, but
rather insufficiently robust. The PVPA's shabby record might be im-
proved through the application of the interpretive canon proposed in
this Article. No canon of statutory interpretation warrants respect if
its "sole consistency" is that one side "always wins. ' 300 The "Progress
of Science and useful Arts" often counsels restraint in the granting of
intellectual property and alacrity in defense of the public interest in
broad dissemination and ultimately of the public domain. The PVPA,
by contrast, teaches a somewhat different lesson. Limitations on the
scope of protection available under that statute have visibly stunted
incentives to innovate within the plant breeding industry.
Finally, it is worth remembering that the inventive process is in
many respects a random walk. Whatever else it might be, innovation
is utterly unpredictable. Creative endeavors enjoy no monopoly on
the insight that output does not necessarily correspond to effort.
"IT] he race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread
to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favor to the men of skill;
but time and chance happen to them all."30 1 The value of talent
"bears little relation to cost of tools and supplies and labor to develop
it."30 2 As a game of chance, industrial research and development ex-
hibits no greater rationality in linking return to investment than does
297 Dan Burk has made some effort to explore GURTs and their impact on the law
of intellectual property. See Burk, supra note 15; Dan L. Burk, Lex Genetica: The Law
and Ethics of Programming Biological Code, 4 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 109 (2002).
298 As the Indigo Girls would express the sentiment, "I've had enough temporary
acquisition / Building fences for no gain." INDIGO GIRLS, Devotion, on RETROSPECTIVE
(Sony 2000).
299 SeeJanis & Kesan, supra note 26, at 774.
300 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
301 Ecclesiastes 9:11.
302 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 648 (1944) (Jack-
son, J., dissenting).
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a "game of poker."303 Neither causation nor correlation connects in-
vestment levels or product prices with the creation of knowledge.
30 4
Seemingly random in its origins and arbitrary in its outcomes, the
lack of regularity within the innovative process sits poorly with those
who prefer that reward bear some systematic relation to investment.
Losers in the innovation lottery are likely to resent the winners, or
even those who metaphorically "worked only one hour" and yet have
been rewarded no less than those "who have borne the burden of the
day and the scorching heat."30 5 No less in the realm of invention than
in "the kingdom of heaven" likened to the manor whose master "went
out early in the morning to hire laborers for his vineyard,"30 6 "the last
will be first, and the first last."307 So teaches another of the New Testa-
ment's agrarian parables, the parable of the sower:
A sower went out to sow. And as he sowed, some seeds fell along the
path, and the birds came and devoured them. Other seeds fell on
rocky ground, where they had not much soil, and immediately they
sprang up, since they had no depth of soil, but when the sun rose
they were scorched; and since they had no root they withered away.
Other seeds fell upon thorns, and the thorns grew up and choked
them. Other seeds fell on good soil and brought forth grain, some
a hundredfold, some sixty, some thirty. He who has ears, let him
hear.308
303 Id. at 649.
304 See David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, The Influence of Market Demand upon
Innovation: A Critical Review of Some Recent Empirical Studies, 8 REs. POL'Y 102 (1989)
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STATUTORY APPENDIX
Selected Sections of the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970,1 as Amended
2
Section 2401. Definitions and rules of construction
(a) Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) Basic seed
The term "basic seed" means the seed planted to produce certi-
fied or commercial seed.
(2) Breeder
The term "breeder" means the person who directs the final
breeding creating a variety or who discovers and develops a vari-
ety. . . .The term does not include a person who redevelops or
rediscovers a variety the existence of which is publicly known or a
matter of common knowledge.
(3) Essentially derived variety
(A) In general
The term "essentially derived variety" means a variety
that-
(i) is predominantly derived from another variety (re-
ferred to in this paragraph as the "initial variety") or from
a variety that is predominantly derived from the initial vari-
ety, while retaining the expression of the essential charac-
teristics that result from the genotype or combination of
genotypes of the initial variety;
(ii) is clearly distinguishable from the initial variety;
and
(iii) except for differences that result from the act of
derivation, conforms to the initial variety in the expression
of the essential characteristics that result from the geno-
type or combination of genotypes of the initial variety.
(B) Methods
An essentially derived variety may be obtained by the selec-
tion of a natural or induced mutant or of a somaclonal variant,
the selection of a variant individual from plants of the initial
variety, backcrossing, transformation by genetic engineering,
or other method.
I Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542.
2 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
127, 110 Stat. 1186; Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-349, 108 Stat. 3136; Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4231 (1992); Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-574,
94 Stat. 3351.
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(4) Kind
The term "kind" means one or more related species or subspe-
cies singly or collectively known by one common name, such as soy-
bean, flax, or radish.
(5) Seed
The term "seed", with respect to a tuber propagated variety,
means the tuber or the part of the tuber used for propagation.
(6) Sexually reproduced
The term "sexually reproduced" includes any production of a
variety by seed, but does not include the production of a variety by
tuber propagation.
(7) Tuber propagated
The term "tuber propagated" means propagated by a tuber or a
part of a tuber.
(9) Variety
The term "variety" means a plant grouping within a single bo-
tanical taxon of the lowest known rank, that, without regard to
whether the conditions for plant variety protection are fully met,
can be defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting
from a given genotype or combination of genotypes, distinguished
from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one
characteristic and considered as a unit with regard to the suitability
of the plant grouping for being propagated unchanged. A variety
may be represented by seed, transplants, plants, tubers, tissue cul-
ture plantlets, and other matter.
(b) Rules of construction
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) Sale or disposition for nonreproductive purposes
The sale or disposition, for other than reproductive purposes,
of harvested material produced as a result of experimentation or
testing of a variety to ascertain the characteristics of the variety, or as
a by-product of increasing a variety, shall not be considered to be a
sale or disposition for purposes of exploitation of the variety.
(2) Sale or disposition for reproductive purposes
The sale or disposition of a variety for reproductive purposes
shall not be considered to be a sale or disposition for the purposes
of exploitation of the variety if the sale or disposition is done as an
integral part of a program of experimentation or testing to ascer-
tain the characteristics of the variety, or to increase the variety on
behalf of the breeder or the successor in interest of the breeder.
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(3) Sale or disposition of hybrid seed
The sale or disposition of hybrid seed shall be considered to be
a sale or disposition of harvested material of the varieties from
which the seed was produced.
(4) Application for protection or entering into a register of varieties
The filing of an application for the protection or for the enter-
ing of a variety in an official register of varieties, in any country,
shall be considered to render the variety a matter of common
knowledge from the date of the application, if the application leads
to the granting of protection or to the entering of the variety in the
official register of varieties, as the case may be.
(5) Distinctness
The distinctness of one variety from another may be based on
one or more identifiable morphological, physiological, or other
characteristics (including any characteristics evidenced by process-
ing or product characteristics, such as milling and baking character-
istics in the case of wheat) with respect to which a difference in
genealogy may contribute evidence.
(6) Publicly known varieties
(A) In general
A variety that is adequately described by a publication rea-
sonably considered to be a part of the public technical knowl-
edge in the United States shall be considered to be publicly
known and a matter of common knowledge.
(B) Description
A description that meets the requirements of subpara-
graph (A) shall include a disclosure of the principal character-
istics by which a variety is distinguished.
(C) Other means
A variety may become publicly known and a matter of com-
mon knowledge by other means.
3
Section 2402. Right to plant variety protection; plant varieties protectable
(a) In general
The breeder of any sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant vari-
ety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has so reproduced the variety, or the
successor in interest of the breeder, shall be entitled to plant variety protec-
tion for the variety, subject to the conditions and requirements of this chap-
ter, if the variety is-
(1) new, in the sense that, on the date of filing of the applica-
tion for plant variety protection, propagating or harvested material
of the variety has not been sold or otherwise disposed of to other
3 7 U.S.C. § 2401 (2000).
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persons, by or with the consent of the breeder, or the successor in
interest of the breeder, for purposes of exploitation of the variety-
(A) in the United States, more than 1 year prior to the
date of filing; or
(B) in any area outside of the United States-
(i) more than 4 years prior to the date of filing... ; or
(ii) in the case of a tree or vine, more than 6 years
prior to the date of filing;
(2) distinct, in the sense that the variety is clearly distinguisha-
ble from any other variety the existence of which is publicly known
or a matter of common knowledge at the time of the filing of the
application;
(3) uniform, in the sense that any variations are describable,
predictable, and commercially acceptable; and
(4) stable, in the sense that the variety, when reproduced, will
remain unchanged with regard to the essential and distinctive char-
acteristics of the variety with a reasonable degree of reliability com-
mensurate with that of varieties of the same category in which the
same breeding method is employed.
4
Section 2404. Public interest in wide usage
The Secretary may declare a protected variety open to use on a basis of
equitable remuneration to the owner, not less than a reasonable royalty,
when the Secretary determines that such declaration is necessary in order to
insure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed in this country and that the
owner is unwilling or unable to supply the public needs for the variety at a
price which may reasonably be deemed fair. Such declaration may be, with
or without limitation, with or without designation of what the remuneration
is to be; and shall be subject to review ... (any finding that the price is not
reasonable being reviewable), and shall remain in effect not more than two
years. In the event litigation is required to collect such remuneration, a
higher rate may be allowed by the court.
5
Section 2422. Content of application
An application for a certificate recognizing plant variety rights shall
contain:
(1) The name of the variety except that a temporary designa-
tion will suffice until the certificate is to be issued. The variety shall
be named in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary.
(2) A description of the variety setting forth its distinctiveness,
uniformity, and stability and a description of the genealogy and
breeding procedure, when known. The Secretary may require am-
4 Id. § 2402.
5 Id. § 2404.
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plification, including the submission of adequate photographs or
drawings or plant specimens, if the description is not adequate or as
complete as is reasonably possible, and submission of records or
proof of ownership or of allegations made in the application. An
applicant may add to or correct the description at any time, before
the certificate is issued, upon a showing acceptable to the Secretary
that the revised description is retroactively accurate. Courts shall
protect others from any injustice which would result. The Secretary
may accept records of the breeder and of any official seed certifying
agency in this country as evidence of stability where applicable.
(3) A statement of the basis of the claim of the applicant that
the variety is new.
(4) A declaration that a viable sample of basic seed (including
any propagating material) necessary for propagation of the variety
will be deposited and replenished periodically in a public repository
in accordance with regulations to be established hereunder.
(5) A statement of the basis of applicant's ownership.
6
Section 2483. Contents and term of plant variety protection
(a) Certificate
(1) Every certificate of plant variety protection shall certify that the
breeder (or the successor in interest of the breeder), has the right, during
the term of the plant variety protection, to exclude others from selling the
variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting
it, or using it in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or
different variety therefrom, to the extent provided by this chapter.
(2) If the owner so elects, the certificate shall-
(A) specify that seed of the variety shall be sold in the United
States only as a class of certified seed; and
(B) if so specified, conform to the number of generations des-
ignated by the owner.
(3) An owner may waive a right provided under this subsection, other
than a right that is elected by the owner under paragraph (2)(A).
(4) The Secretary may at the discretion of the Secretary permit such
election or waiver to be made after certificating and amend the certificate
accordingly, without retroactive effect.
(b) Term
(1) In general
Except as provided in paragrpah (2), the term of plant variety
protection shall expire 20 years from the date of issue of the certifi-
cate in the United States, execpt that-
(A) in the case of a tuber propagated plant variety subject
to a waiver granted under section 2402(a) (1) (B) (i) of this tide,
6 Id. § 2422.
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the term of the plant variety protection shall expire 20 years
after the date of the original grant of the plant breeder's rights
to the variety outside of the United States; and
(B) in the case of a tree or vine, the term of the plant
variety protection shall expire 25 years from the date of issue of
the certificate
(2) Exceptions
If the certificate is not issued within three years from the effec-
tive filing date, the Secretary may shorten the term by the amount
of delay in the prosecution of the application attributed by the Sec-
retary to the applicant.
(c) Expiration upon failure to comply with regulations; notice
The term of plant variety protection shall also expire if the owner fails to
comply with regulations, in force at the time of certificating, relating to re-
plenishing seed in a public repository .... 7
Section 2541. Infringement of plant variety protection
(a) Acts constituting infrigement
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, it shall be an infringe-
ment of the rights of the owner of a protected variety to perform without
authority, any of the following acts in the United States, or in commerce
which can be regulated by Congress or affecting such commerce, prior to
expiration of the right to plant variety protection but after either the issue of
the certificate or the distribution of a protected plant variety with the notice
under section 2567 of this title:
(1) sell or market the protected variety, or offer it or expose it
for sale, deliver it, ship it, consign it, exchange it, or solicit an offer
to buy it, or any other transfer of title or possession of it;
(2) import the variety into, or export it from, the United States;
(3) sexually multiply, or propagate by a tuber or a part of a
tuber, the variety as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the
variety;
(4) use the variety in producing (as distinguished from devel-
oping) a hybrid or different variety therefrom;
(5) use seed which had been marked "Unauthorized Propaga-
tion Prohibited" or "Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohibited"
or progeny thereof to propagate the variety;
(6) dispense the variety to another, in a form which can be
propagated, without notice as to being a protected variety under
which it was received;
(7) condition the variety for the purpose of propagation, ex-
cept to the extent that the conditioning is related to the activities
permitted under section 2543 of this title;
7 Id. § 2483.
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(8) stock the variety for any of the purposes referred to in
paragraphs (1) through (7);
(9) perform any of the foregoing acts even in instances in
which the variety is multiplied other than sexually, except in pursu-
ance of a valid United States plant patent; or
(10) instigate or actively induce performance of any of the fore-
going acts.
(c) Applicability to certain plant varieties
This section shall apply equally to-
(1) any variety that is essentially derived from a protected variety, unless
the protected variety is an essentially derived variety;
(2) any variety that is not clearly distinguishable from a protected
variety;
(3) any variety whose production requires the repeated use of a pro-
tected variety; and
(4) harvested material (including entire plants and parts of plants) ob-
tained through the unauthorized use of propagating material of a protected
variety, unless the owner of the variety has had a reasonable opportunity to
exercise the rights provided under this chapter with respect to the propagat-
ing material.
(d) Acts not considered infringing
It shall not be an infringement of the rights of the owner of a variety to
perform any act concerning propagating material of any kind, or harvested
material, including entire plants and parts of plants, of a protected variety
that is sold or otherwise marketed with the consent of the owner in the
United States, unless the act involves further propagation of the variety or
involves an export of material of the variety, that enables the propagation of
the variety, into a country that does not protect varieties of the plant genus or
species to which the variety belongs, unless the exported material is for final
consumption purposes.
(e) Private, noncommercial uses
It shall not be an infringement of the rights of the owner of a variety to
perform any act done privately and for noncommercial purposes.
(f) "Perform without authority" defined
As used in this section, the term "perform without authority" includes
performance without authority by any State, any instrumentality of a State,
and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in
the official capacity of the officer or employee. Any State, and any such in-
str-umentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental
entity.
8
8 Id. § 2541.
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Section 2543. Right to save seed; crop exemption
Except to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement
under subsections (3) and (4) of section 2541 of this title, it shall not infringe
any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from
seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner
of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production
of a crop for use on the farm of the person, or for sale as provided in this
section. A bona fide sale for other than reproductive purposes, made in
channels usual for such other purposes, of seed produced on a farm either
from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes or from
seed produced by descent on such farm from seed obtained by authority of
the owner for seeding purposes shall not constitute an infringement. A pur-
chaser who diverts seed from such channels to seeding purposes shall be
deemed to have notice under section 2567 of this title that the actions of the
purchaser constitute an infringement.9
Section 2544. Research exemption
The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or
other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the protec-
tion provided under this chapter.1 0
Section 2581. Intent
It is the intent of Congress to provide the indicated protection for new
varieties by exercise of any constitutional power needed for that end, so as to
afford adequate encouragement for research, and for marketing when ap-
propriate, to yield for the public the benefits of new varieties. Constitutional
clauses 3 and 8 of article I, section 8 are both relied upon."
Section 2582. Severability
If this chapter is held unconstitutional as to some provisions or circum-
stances, it shall remain in force as to the remaining provisions and other
circumstances.
12
9 Id. § 2543 (footnote omitted).
10 Id. § 2544.
11 Id. § 2581.
12 Id. § 2582.
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